Clean up

I think this is designed in a way that will make it very hard to parallelize later. I should fix that when I can.

Cargo.toml

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ hyper-rustls = "0.26.0"
 hyper-util = { version = "0.1", features = ["full"] }
 julianday = "1.2.0"
 lazy_static = "1"
+lox_cli = { path = "../lox_cli", version = "0.1", optional = true }
 lox-library = { git = "https://gitlab.torproject.org/vecna/lox.git", version = "0.1.0" }
 nalgebra = "0.29"
 rand = { version = "0.8" }
@@ -42,4 +43,4 @@ x25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["serde", "static_secrets"] }
 base64 = "0.21.7"
 
 [features]
-simulation = []
+simulation = ["lox_cli"]

src/lib.rs

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ pub mod request_handler;
 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "simulation"))]
 pub mod simulation {
     pub mod extra_infos_server;
+    pub mod state;
+    pub mod user;
 }
 
 use analysis::Analyzer;

src/simulation/state.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+use lox_cli::networking::*;
+use lox_library::IssuerPubKey;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use x25519_dalek::PublicKey;
+
+pub struct State {
+    pub la_pubkeys: Vec<IssuerPubKey>,
+    pub net: HyperNet,
+    pub net_test: HyperNet,
+    pub net_tp: HyperNet,
+    // Probability that if Alice invites Bob, Alice and Bob are in the same
+    // country. This is in *addition* to the regular probability that Bob is in
+    // that country by random selection.
+    pub prob_friend_in_same_country: f64,
+    pub prob_user_invites_friend: f64,
+    pub prob_user_is_censor: f64,
+    pub prob_user_submits_reports: f64,
+    pub probs_user_in_country: Vec<(String, f64)>,
+    pub tp_pubkeys: HashMap<u32, PublicKey>,
+}

src/simulation/user.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+// User behavior in simulation
+
+use crate::{
+    get_date, negative_report::NegativeReport, positive_report::PositiveReport,
+    simulation::state::State, BridgeDistributor,
+};
+use lox_cli::{networking::*, *};
+use lox_library::{
+    bridge_table::BridgeLine, cred::Lox, proto::check_blockage::MIN_TRUST_LEVEL, scalar_u32,
+};
+use rand::Rng;
+
+pub struct User {
+    // Does this user cooperate with a censor?
+    censor: bool,
+
+    // 2-character country code
+    country: String,
+
+    // The user always has a primary credential. If this credential's bucket is
+    // blocked, the user may replace it or temporarily hold two credentials
+    // while waiting to migrate from the primary credential.
+    primary_cred: Lox,
+    secondary_cred: Option<Lox>,
+
+    // Does the user submit reports to Troll Patrol?
+    submits_reports: bool,
+}
+
+impl User {
+    pub async fn new(state: &State) -> Self {
+        let cred = get_lox_credential(
+            &state.net,
+            &get_open_invitation(&state.net).await,
+            get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+        )
+        .await
+        .0;
+
+        // Probabilistically decide whether this user cooperates with a censor
+        let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
+        let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
+        let censor = num < state.prob_user_is_censor;
+
+        // Probabilistically decide whether this user submits reports
+        let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
+        let submits_reports = num < state.prob_user_submits_reports;
+
+        // Probabilistically decide user's country
+        let mut num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
+        let cc = {
+            let mut cc = String::default();
+            for (country, prob) in &state.probs_user_in_country {
+                let prob = *prob;
+                if prob < num {
+                    cc = country.to_string();
+                    break;
+                } else {
+                    num -= prob;
+                }
+            }
+            cc
+        };
+
+        Self {
+            censor: censor,
+            country: cc,
+            primary_cred: cred,
+            secondary_cred: None,
+            submits_reports: submits_reports,
+        }
+    }
+
+    // TODO: This should probably return an actual error type
+    pub async fn invite(&mut self, state: &State) -> Result<Self, String> {
+        let etable = get_reachability_credential(&state.net).await;
+        let (new_cred, invite) = issue_invite(
+            &state.net,
+            &self.primary_cred,
+            &etable,
+            get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+            get_reachability_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+            get_invitation_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+        )
+        .await;
+        self.primary_cred = new_cred;
+        let friend_cred = redeem_invite(
+            &state.net,
+            &invite,
+            get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+            get_invitation_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+        )
+        .await
+        .0;
+
+        // Probabilistically decide whether this user cooperates with a censor
+        // We do not influence this by the inviting friend's status. Anyone
+        // might have friends who are untrustworthy, and censors may invite
+        // non-censors to maintain an illusion of trustworthiness. Also, a
+        // "censor" user may not be knowingly helping a censor.
+        let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
+        let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
+        let censor = num < state.prob_user_is_censor;
+
+        // Probabilistically decide whether this user submits reports
+        let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
+        let submits_reports = num < state.prob_user_submits_reports;
+
+        // Determine user's country
+        let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
+        let cc = if num < state.prob_friend_in_same_country {
+            self.country.to_string()
+        } else {
+            // Probabilistically decide user's country
+            let mut num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
+            let mut cc = String::default();
+            for (country, prob) in &state.probs_user_in_country {
+                let prob = *prob;
+                if prob < num {
+                    cc = country.to_string();
+                    break;
+                } else {
+                    num -= prob;
+                }
+            }
+            cc
+        };
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            censor: censor,
+            country: cc,
+            primary_cred: friend_cred,
+            secondary_cred: None,
+            submits_reports: submits_reports,
+        })
+    }
+
+    // Attempt to "connect" to the bridge, returns true if successful
+    pub fn connect(&self, bridge: &BridgeLine) -> bool {
+        true
+    }
+
+    pub async fn send_negative_reports(state: &State, reports: Vec<NegativeReport>) {
+        let date = get_date();
+        let pubkey = state.tp_pubkeys.get(&date).unwrap();
+        for report in reports {
+            state
+                .net_tp
+                .request(
+                    "/negativereport".to_string(),
+                    bincode::serialize(&report.encrypt(&pubkey)).unwrap(),
+                )
+                .await;
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub async fn send_positive_reports(state: &State, reports: Vec<PositiveReport>) {
+        for report in reports {
+            state
+                .net_tp
+                .request("/positivereport".to_string(), report.to_json().into_bytes())
+                .await;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // User performs daily connection attempts, etc. and returns a vector of
+    // newly invited friends and a vector of fingerprints of successfully
+    // contacted bridges.
+    pub async fn daily_tasks(&mut self, state: &State) -> (Vec<User>, Vec<[u8; 20]>) {
+        // Download bucket to see if bridge is still reachable
+        // (We assume that this step can be done even if the user can't actually
+        // talk to the LA.)
+        let (bucket, reachcred) = get_bucket(&state.net, &self.primary_cred).await;
+        let level = scalar_u32(&self.primary_cred.trust_level).unwrap();
+
+        // Can we level up the main credential?
+        let can_level_up = reachcred.is_some()
+            && (level == 0 && eligible_for_trust_promotion(&state.net, &self.primary_cred).await
+                || level > 0 && eligible_for_level_up(&state.net, &self.primary_cred).await);
+
+        // Can we migrate the main credential?
+        let can_migrate = reachcred.is_none() && level >= MIN_TRUST_LEVEL;
+
+        // Can we level up the secondary credential?
+        let mut second_level_up = false;
+
+        let mut failed = Vec::<BridgeLine>::new();
+        let mut succeeded = Vec::<BridgeLine>::new();
+        for i in 0..bucket.len() {
+            // At level 0, we only have 1 bridge
+            if (level > 0 || i == 0) && self.connect(&bucket[i]) {
+                if self.submits_reports && level >= 3 {
+                    succeeded.push(bucket[i]);
+                }
+                break;
+            } else {
+                if self.submits_reports {
+                    failed.push(bucket[i]);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        let second_cred = if succeeded.len() < 1 {
+            if self.secondary_cred.is_some() {
+                std::mem::replace(&mut self.secondary_cred, None)
+            } else {
+                // Get new credential
+                let cred = get_lox_credential(
+                    &state.net,
+                    &get_open_invitation(&state.net).await,
+                    get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+                )
+                .await
+                .0;
+                Some(cred)
+            }
+        } else {
+            // If we're able to connect with the primary credential, don't
+            // keep a secondary one.
+            None
+        };
+        if second_cred.is_some() {
+            let second_cred = second_cred.as_ref().unwrap();
+            let (second_bucket, second_reachcred) = get_bucket(&state.net, &second_cred).await;
+            if self.connect(&second_bucket[0]) {
+                succeeded.push(second_bucket[0]);
+                if second_reachcred.is_some()
+                    && eligible_for_trust_promotion(&state.net, &second_cred).await
+                {
+                    second_level_up = true;
+                }
+            } else {
+                failed.push(second_bucket[0]);
+            }
+        }
+
+        let mut negative_reports = Vec::<NegativeReport>::new();
+        let mut positive_reports = Vec::<PositiveReport>::new();
+        if self.submits_reports {
+            for bridge in &failed {
+                negative_reports.push(NegativeReport::from_bridgeline(
+                    *bridge,
+                    self.country.to_string(),
+                    BridgeDistributor::Lox,
+                ));
+            }
+            if level >= 3 {
+                for bridge in &succeeded {
+                    positive_reports.push(
+                        PositiveReport::from_lox_credential(
+                            bridge.fingerprint,
+                            None,
+                            &self.primary_cred,
+                            get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+                            self.country.to_string(),
+                        )
+                        .unwrap(),
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // We might restrict these steps to succeeded.len() > 0, but we do
+        // assume the user can contact the LA somehow, so let's just allow it.
+        if can_level_up {
+            let cred = level_up(
+                &state.net,
+                &self.primary_cred,
+                &reachcred.unwrap(),
+                get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+                get_reachability_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+            )
+            .await;
+            self.primary_cred = cred;
+            self.secondary_cred = None;
+        }
+        // We favor starting over at level 1 to migrating
+        else if second_level_up {
+            let second_cred = second_cred.as_ref().unwrap();
+            let cred = trust_migration(
+                &state.net,
+                &second_cred,
+                &trust_promotion(&state.net, &second_cred, get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys)).await,
+                get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+                get_migration_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+            )
+            .await;
+            self.primary_cred = cred;
+            self.secondary_cred = None;
+        } else if can_migrate {
+            let cred = blockage_migration(
+                &state.net,
+                &self.primary_cred,
+                &check_blockage(
+                    &state.net,
+                    &self.primary_cred,
+                    get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+                )
+                .await,
+                get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+                get_migration_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
+            )
+            .await;
+            self.primary_cred = cred;
+            self.secondary_cred = None;
+        } else if second_cred.is_some() {
+            // Couldn't connect with primary credential
+            if succeeded.len() > 0 {
+                // Keep the second credential only if it's useful
+                self.secondary_cred = second_cred;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if negative_reports.len() > 0 {
+            Self::send_negative_reports(&state, negative_reports).await;
+        }
+        if positive_reports.len() > 0 {
+            Self::send_positive_reports(&state, positive_reports).await;
+        }
+
+        // Invite friends if applicable
+        let invitations = scalar_u32(&self.primary_cred.invites_remaining).unwrap();
+        let mut new_friends = Vec::<User>::new();
+        for _i in 0..invitations {
+            let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
+            let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
+            if num < state.prob_user_invites_friend {
+                match self.invite(&state).await {
+                    Ok(friend) => {
+                        // You really shouldn't push your friends, especially
+                        // new ones whose boundaries you might not know well.
+                        new_friends.push(friend);
+                    }
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        println!("{}", e);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // List of fingerprints we contacted. This should not actually be more
+        // than one.
+        let mut connections = Vec::<[u8; 20]>::new();
+        for bridge in succeeded {
+            connections.push(bridge.get_hashed_fingerprint());
+        }
+
+        (new_friends, connections)
+    }
+}