Start adding censors, behavior for connecting to bridges

This commit is contained in:
Vecna 2024-05-24 17:32:10 -04:00
parent 659b8fa16c
commit 9e8a0c8fca
5 changed files with 250 additions and 27 deletions

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@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ pub mod request_handler;
#[cfg(feature = "simulation")]
pub mod simulation {
pub mod bridge;
pub mod censor;
pub mod extra_infos_server;
pub mod state;
pub mod user;

49
src/simulation/bridge.rs Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
use lox_library::bridge_table::BridgeLine;
use std::collections::HashMap;
pub struct Bridge {
pub fingerprint: [u8; 20],
real_connections: HashMap<String, u32>,
total_connections: HashMap<String, u32>,
}
impl Bridge {
pub fn new(fingerprint: &[u8; 20]) -> Self {
Self {
fingerprint: *fingerprint,
real_connections: HashMap::<String, u32>::new(),
total_connections: HashMap::<String, u32>::new(),
}
}
pub fn from_bridge_line(bridgeline: &BridgeLine) -> Self {
Self::new(&bridgeline.fingerprint)
}
pub fn connect_real(&mut self, country: &str) {
if self.real_connections.contains_key(country) {
let prev = self.real_connections.get(country).unwrap();
self.real_connections
.insert(country.to_string(), prev + 1)
.unwrap();
} else {
self.real_connections
.insert(country.to_string(), 1)
.unwrap();
}
self.connect_total(country);
}
pub fn connect_total(&mut self, country: &str) {
if self.total_connections.contains_key(country) {
let prev = self.total_connections.get(country).unwrap();
self.total_connections
.insert(country.to_string(), prev + 1)
.unwrap();
} else {
self.total_connections
.insert(country.to_string(), 1)
.unwrap();
}
}
}

99
src/simulation/censor.rs Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
use crate::{get_date, simulation::bridge::Bridge};
use lox_library::{cred::Lox, scalar_u32};
use rand::Rng;
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
pub struct Censor {
pub country: String,
pub known_bridges: HashSet<[u8; 20]>,
pub lox_credentials: HashMap<[u8; 20], Lox>,
// How fast does this censor block bridges after learning about them?
pub speed: Speed,
// If censor implements random blocking, this is the date when it
// will start blocking all the bridges it knows.
pub delay_date: u32,
// Does the censor attempt to hide the fact that a bridge has been blocked?
pub hides: Hides,
// Does the censor block bridges uniformly across the country?
pub totality: Totality,
// If censor implements partial blocking, what percent of
// connections are blocked? If totality is not partial, this is set
// to 100%.
pub partial_blocking_percent: f64,
}
impl Censor {
pub fn new(country: String, speed: Speed, hides: Hides, totality: Totality) -> Self {
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let delay_date = if speed == Speed::Random {
let num: u32 = rng.gen_range(1..365);
get_date() + num
} else {
0
};
let partial_blocking_percent = if totality == Totality::Partial {
let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
num
} else {
1.0
};
Censor {
country: country,
known_bridges: HashSet::<[u8; 20]>::new(),
lox_credentials: HashMap::<[u8; 20], Lox>::new(),
speed: speed,
delay_date: delay_date,
hides: hides,
totality: totality,
partial_blocking_percent: partial_blocking_percent,
}
}
pub fn knows_bridge(&self, bridge: &Bridge) -> bool {
self.known_bridges.contains(&bridge.fingerprint)
}
pub fn learn_bridge(&mut self, fingerprint: &[u8; 20]) {
self.known_bridges.insert(*fingerprint);
}
pub fn has_lox_cred(&self, bridge: &Bridge) -> bool {
self.lox_credentials.contains_key(&bridge.fingerprint)
}
pub fn give_lox_cred(&mut self, bridge: &Bridge, cred: Lox) {
// We only need one level 3+ credential per bridge. (This will
// change if we restrict positive reports to one per bridge per
// credential.)
if !self.lox_credentials.contains_key(&bridge.fingerprint)
&& scalar_u32(&cred.trust_level).unwrap() >= 3
{
self.lox_credentials.insert(bridge.fingerprint, cred);
}
}
}
#[derive(PartialEq)]
pub enum Speed {
Fast,
Lox,
Random,
}
#[derive(PartialEq)]
pub enum Hides {
Overt,
Hiding,
Flooding,
}
#[derive(PartialEq)]
pub enum Totality {
Full,
Partial,
Throttling,
}

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@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ pub struct State {
pub net: HyperNet,
pub net_test: HyperNet,
pub net_tp: HyperNet,
// Probability that a connection randomly fails, even though censor
// does not block the bridge
pub prob_connection_fails: f64,
// Probability that if Alice invites Bob, Alice and Bob are in the same
// country. This is in *addition* to the regular probability that Bob is in
// that country by random selection.

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@ -1,16 +1,31 @@
// User behavior in simulation
use crate::{
get_date, negative_report::NegativeReport, positive_report::PositiveReport,
simulation::state::State, BridgeDistributor,
get_date,
negative_report::NegativeReport,
positive_report::PositiveReport,
simulation::{
bridge::Bridge,
censor::{Censor, Hides::*, Speed::*, Totality::*},
state::State,
},
BridgeDistributor,
};
use lox_cli::{networking::*, *};
use lox_library::{
bridge_table::BridgeLine, cred::Lox, proto::check_blockage::MIN_TRUST_LEVEL, scalar_u32,
};
use rand::Rng;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use x25519_dalek::PublicKey;
// Helper function to probabilistically return true or false
pub fn event_happens(probability: f64) -> bool {
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
num < probability
}
pub struct User {
// Does this user cooperate with a censor?
censor: bool,
@ -42,15 +57,13 @@ impl User {
.0;
// Probabilistically decide whether this user cooperates with a censor
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
let censor = num < state.prob_user_is_censor;
let censor = event_happens(state.prob_user_is_censor);
// Probabilistically decide whether this user submits reports
let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
let submits_reports = num < state.prob_user_submits_reports;
let submits_reports = event_happens(state.prob_user_submits_reports);
// Probabilistically decide user's country
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let mut num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
let cc = {
let mut cc = String::default();
@ -107,20 +120,17 @@ impl User {
// might have friends who are untrustworthy, and censors may invite
// non-censors to maintain an illusion of trustworthiness. Also, a
// "censor" user may not be knowingly helping a censor.
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
let censor = num < state.prob_user_is_censor;
let censor = event_happens(state.prob_user_is_censor);
// Probabilistically decide whether this user submits reports
let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
let submits_reports = num < state.prob_user_submits_reports;
let submits_reports = event_happens(state.prob_user_submits_reports);
// Determine user's country
let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
let cc = if num < state.prob_friend_in_same_country {
let cc = if event_happens(state.prob_friend_in_same_country) {
self.country.to_string()
} else {
// Probabilistically decide user's country
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let mut num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
let mut cc = String::default();
for (country, prob) in &state.probs_user_in_country {
@ -137,6 +147,7 @@ impl User {
// Randomly determine how likely this user is to use bridges on
// a given day
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let prob_use_bridges = rng.gen_range(0.0..=1.0);
Ok(Self {
@ -150,7 +161,36 @@ impl User {
}
// Attempt to "connect" to the bridge, returns true if successful
pub fn connect(&self, bridge: &BridgeLine) -> bool {
pub fn connect(&self, state: &State, bridge: &mut Bridge, censor: &Censor) -> bool {
if censor.knows_bridge(bridge) {
if censor.speed == Fast
|| censor.speed == Random && censor.delay_date <= get_date()
|| censor.speed == Lox && censor.has_lox_cred(bridge)
{
if censor.totality == Full
|| censor.totality == Partial && event_happens(censor.partial_blocking_percent)
|| censor.totality == Throttling
{
// If censor tries to hide its censorship or
// throttles rather than actually blocking, record a
// false connection
if censor.hides == Hiding || censor.totality == Throttling {
bridge.connect_total(&self.country);
}
// Return false because the connection failed
return false;
}
}
}
// Connection may randomly fail, without censor intervention
if event_happens(state.prob_connection_fails) {
return false;
}
// If we haven't returned yet, the connection succeeded
bridge.connect_real(&self.country);
true
}
@ -188,20 +228,36 @@ impl User {
}
}
// User performs daily connection attempts, etc. and returns a vector of
// newly invited friends and a vector of fingerprints of successfully
// contacted bridges.
pub async fn daily_tasks(&mut self, state: &State) -> (Vec<User>, Vec<[u8; 20]>) {
// User performs daily connection attempts, etc. and returns a
// vector of newly invited friends and a vector of fingerprints of
// successfully contacted bridges.
// TODO: The maps of bridges and censors should be Arc<Mutex<>> or
// something so we can parallelize this.
pub async fn daily_tasks(
&mut self,
state: &State,
bridges: &mut HashMap<[u8; 20], Bridge>,
censors: &mut HashMap<String, Censor>,
) -> (Vec<User>, Vec<[u8; 20]>) {
let censor = censors.get(&self.country).unwrap();
// Probabilistically decide if the user should use bridges today
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
if num < self.prob_use_bridges {
if event_happens(self.prob_use_bridges) {
// Download bucket to see if bridge is still reachable
// (We assume that this step can be done even if the user can't actually
// talk to the LA.)
let (bucket, reachcred) = get_bucket(&state.net, &self.primary_cred).await;
let level = scalar_u32(&self.primary_cred.trust_level).unwrap();
// Make sure each bridge in bucket is in the global bridges set
for bridge in bucket {
if !bridges.contains_key(&bridge.fingerprint) {
bridges
.insert(bridge.fingerprint, Bridge::from_bridge_line(&bridge))
.unwrap();
}
}
// Can we level up the main credential?
let can_level_up = reachcred.is_some()
&& (level == 0
@ -219,7 +275,11 @@ impl User {
for i in 0..bucket.len() {
// At level 0, we only have 1 bridge
if level > 0 || i == 0 {
if self.connect(&bucket[i]) {
if self.connect(
&state,
bridges.get_mut(&bucket[i].fingerprint).unwrap(),
&censor,
) {
succeeded.push(bucket[i]);
} else {
failed.push(bucket[i]);
@ -248,7 +308,19 @@ impl User {
if second_cred.is_some() {
let second_cred = second_cred.as_ref().unwrap();
let (second_bucket, second_reachcred) = get_bucket(&state.net, &second_cred).await;
if self.connect(&second_bucket[0]) {
if !bridges.contains_key(&second_bucket[0].fingerprint) {
bridges
.insert(
second_bucket[0].fingerprint,
Bridge::from_bridge_line(&second_bucket[0]),
)
.unwrap();
}
if self.connect(
&state,
bridges.get_mut(&second_bucket[0].fingerprint).unwrap(),
&censor,
) {
succeeded.push(second_bucket[0]);
if second_reachcred.is_some()
&& eligible_for_trust_promotion(&state.net, &second_cred).await
@ -349,9 +421,7 @@ impl User {
let invitations = scalar_u32(&self.primary_cred.invites_remaining).unwrap();
let mut new_friends = Vec::<User>::new();
for _i in 0..invitations {
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
if num < state.prob_user_invites_friend {
if event_happens(state.prob_user_invites_friend) {
match self.invite(&state).await {
Ok(friend) => {
// You really shouldn't push your friends, especially