Simulate only one censor at a time

This commit is contained in:
Vecna 2024-05-28 15:23:25 -04:00
parent df813355c8
commit 9cb967ca61
7 changed files with 399 additions and 286 deletions

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@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ use troll_patrol::{
increment_simulated_date,
simulation::{
bridge::Bridge,
censor::{Censor, Hides::*, Speed::*, Totality::*},
censor::{self, Censor},
config::Config as SConfig,
extra_infos_server,
state::State,
user::User,
},
};
@ -42,17 +42,20 @@ pub struct Config {
pub la_test_port: u16,
pub tp_port: u16,
pub tp_test_port: u16,
pub censor_hides: censor::Hides,
pub censor_speed: censor::Speed,
pub censor_event_duration: u32,
pub censor_totality: censor::Totality,
pub censor_partial_blocking_percent: f64,
pub country: String,
pub min_new_users_per_day: u32,
pub max_new_users_per_day: u32,
// How many days to simulate
pub num_days: u32,
pub prob_connection_fails: f64,
pub prob_friend_in_same_country: f64,
pub prob_user_invites_friend: f64,
pub prob_user_is_censor: f64,
pub prob_user_submits_reports: f64,
pub probs_user_in_country: Vec<(String, f64)>,
pub sharing: bool,
}
#[tokio::main]
@ -82,27 +85,26 @@ pub async fn main() {
let la_pubkeys = get_lox_auth_keys(&la_net).await;
let state = State {
let sconfig = SConfig {
la_pubkeys,
la_net,
tp_net,
la_pubkeys,
censor_hides: config.censor_hides,
censor_speed: config.censor_speed,
censor_event_duration: config.censor_event_duration,
censor_totality: config.censor_totality,
censor_partial_blocking_percent: config.censor_partial_blocking_percent,
country: config.country,
prob_connection_fails: config.prob_connection_fails,
prob_friend_in_same_country: config.prob_friend_in_same_country,
prob_user_invites_friend: config.prob_user_invites_friend,
prob_user_is_censor: config.prob_user_is_censor,
prob_user_submits_reports: config.prob_user_submits_reports,
probs_user_in_country: config.probs_user_in_country.clone(),
sharing: config.sharing,
};
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
// Set up censors
let mut censors = HashMap::<String, Censor>::new();
for i in 0..config.probs_user_in_country.len() {
let cc = config.probs_user_in_country[i].0.clone();
censors.insert(cc.clone(), Censor::new(cc, Fast, Overt, Full));
}
// Set up censor
let mut censor = Censor::new(&sconfig);
// Set up bridges (no bridges yet)
let mut bridges = HashMap::<[u8; 20], Bridge>::new();
@ -129,15 +131,14 @@ pub async fn main() {
let num_new_users: u32 =
rng.gen_range(config.min_new_users_per_day..=config.max_new_users_per_day);
for _ in 0..num_new_users {
users.push(User::new(&state).await);
users.push(User::new(&sconfig).await);
}
let mut new_users = Vec::<User>::new();
// Users do daily actions
for user in &mut users {
// TODO: Refactor out connections from return
let mut invited_friends = user.daily_tasks(&state, &mut bridges, &mut censors).await;
let mut invited_friends = user.daily_tasks(&sconfig, &mut bridges, &mut censor).await;
// If this user invited any friends, add them to the list of users
new_users.append(&mut invited_friends);
@ -147,15 +148,13 @@ pub async fn main() {
users.append(&mut new_users);
// CENSOR TASKS
for (_, censor) in censors.iter_mut() {
censor.end_of_day_tasks(&state, &mut bridges).await;
}
censor.end_of_day_tasks(&sconfig, &mut bridges).await;
// BRIDGE TASKS
let mut new_extra_infos = HashSet::<ExtraInfo>::new();
for (_, bridge) in bridges.iter_mut() {
// Bridge reports its connections for the day
new_extra_infos.insert(bridge.gen_extra_info());
new_extra_infos.insert(bridge.gen_extra_info(&sconfig.country));
// Bridge resets for tomorrow
bridge.reset_for_tomorrow();
@ -178,11 +177,12 @@ pub async fn main() {
for (bridge, ccs) in new_blockages {
let fingerprint = array_bytes::hex2array(bridge).unwrap();
for cc in ccs {
let censor = censors.get(&cc).unwrap();
if censor.knows_bridge(&fingerprint) {
tp += 1;
} else {
fp += 1;
if cc == sconfig.country {
if censor.knows_bridge(&fingerprint) {
tp += 1;
} else {
fp += 1;
}
}
}
}

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@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ pub mod request_handler;
pub mod simulation {
pub mod bridge;
pub mod censor;
pub mod config;
pub mod extra_infos_server;
pub mod state;
pub mod user;
}

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@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
use crate::{extra_info::ExtraInfo, get_date};
use lox_library::bridge_table::BridgeLine;
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, HashMap};
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
// The Bridge struct only tracks data for today
pub struct Bridge {
pub fingerprint: [u8; 20],
real_connections: HashMap<String, u32>,
total_connections: BTreeMap<String, u32>,
real_connections: u32,
total_connections: u32,
}
impl Bridge {
pub fn new(fingerprint: &[u8; 20]) -> Self {
Self {
fingerprint: *fingerprint,
real_connections: HashMap::<String, u32>::new(),
total_connections: BTreeMap::<String, u32>::new(),
real_connections: 0,
total_connections: 0,
}
}
@ -22,49 +22,38 @@ impl Bridge {
Self::new(&bridgeline.get_hashed_fingerprint())
}
pub fn connect_real(&mut self, country: &str) {
if self.real_connections.contains_key(country) {
let prev = self.real_connections.get(country).unwrap();
self.real_connections.insert(country.to_string(), prev + 1);
} else {
self.real_connections.insert(country.to_string(), 1);
}
self.connect_total(country);
pub fn connect_real(&mut self) {
self.real_connections += 1;
self.total_connections += 1;
}
pub fn connect_total(&mut self, country: &str) {
if self.total_connections.contains_key(country) {
let prev = self.total_connections.get(country).unwrap();
self.total_connections.insert(country.to_string(), prev + 1);
} else {
self.total_connections.insert(country.to_string(), 1);
}
pub fn connect_total(&mut self) {
self.total_connections += 1;
}
// Let the censor simulate a bunch of connections at once
pub fn censor_flood(&mut self, country: &str, num_connections: u32) {
if self.total_connections.contains_key(country) {
let prev = self.total_connections.get(country).unwrap();
self.total_connections
.insert(country.to_string(), prev + num_connections);
} else {
self.total_connections
.insert(country.to_string(), num_connections);
}
pub fn censor_flood(&mut self, num_connections: u32) {
self.total_connections += num_connections;
}
// Generate an extra-info report for today
pub fn gen_extra_info(&self) -> ExtraInfo {
pub fn gen_extra_info(&self, country: &str) -> ExtraInfo {
let mut bridge_ips = BTreeMap::<String, u32>::new();
// Round up to a multiple of 8
let rounded_connection_count =
self.total_connections + 7 - (self.total_connections + 7) % 8;
//let rounded_connection_count = (self.total_connections + 7) / 8 * 8;
bridge_ips.insert(country.to_string(), rounded_connection_count);
ExtraInfo {
nickname: String::from("simulation-bridge"),
fingerprint: self.fingerprint,
date: get_date(),
bridge_ips: self.total_connections.clone(),
bridge_ips,
}
}
pub fn reset_for_tomorrow(&mut self) {
self.real_connections = HashMap::<String, u32>::new();
self.total_connections = BTreeMap::<String, u32>::new();
self.real_connections = 0;
self.total_connections = 0;
}
}

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@ -1,59 +1,52 @@
use crate::{
get_date,
simulation::{bridge::Bridge, state::State},
simulation::{bridge::Bridge, config::Config},
PositiveReport,
};
use lox_cli::{get_lox_pub, networking::Networking};
use lox_library::{cred::Lox, scalar_u32};
use rand::Rng;
use serde::Deserialize;
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
pub struct Censor {
pub country: String,
pub known_bridges: HashSet<[u8; 20]>,
pub lox_credentials: HashMap<[u8; 20], Lox>,
// How fast does this censor block bridges after learning about them?
pub speed: Speed,
// We don't actually implement the technical restriction to prevent
// one Lox credential from being used to submit many reports, so we
// just implement this as a map of bridge fingerprint to (most
// recent Lox credential for this bridge, count of unique level 3+
// credentials we have for this bridge).
pub lox_credentials: HashMap<[u8; 20], (Lox, u32)>,
// If censor implements random blocking, this is the date when it
// will start blocking all the bridges it knows.
pub delay_date: u32,
// Does the censor attempt to hide the fact that a bridge has been blocked?
pub hides: Hides,
// Does the censor block bridges uniformly across the country?
pub totality: Totality,
// If censor implements partial blocking, what percent of
// connections are blocked? If totality is not partial, this is set
// to 100%.
// connections are blocked?
pub partial_blocking_percent: f64,
}
impl Censor {
pub fn new(country: String, speed: Speed, hides: Hides, totality: Totality) -> Self {
pub fn new(config: &Config) -> Self {
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let delay_date = if speed == Speed::Random {
let delay_date = if config.censor_speed == Speed::Random {
let num: u32 = rng.gen_range(1..365);
get_date() + num
} else {
0
};
let partial_blocking_percent = if totality == Totality::Partial {
let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
num
let partial_blocking_percent = if config.censor_totality == Totality::Partial {
config.censor_partial_blocking_percent
} else {
1.0
};
Censor {
country: country,
known_bridges: HashSet::<[u8; 20]>::new(),
lox_credentials: HashMap::<[u8; 20], Lox>::new(),
speed: speed,
lox_credentials: HashMap::<[u8; 20], (Lox, u32)>::new(),
delay_date: delay_date,
hides: hides,
totality: totality,
partial_blocking_percent: partial_blocking_percent,
}
}
@ -78,41 +71,52 @@ impl Censor {
// We want to clone the credential, but that's not allowed,
// so we're going to serialize it and then deserialize it.
let cloned_cred = bincode::deserialize(&bincode::serialize(&cred).unwrap()).unwrap();
self.lox_credentials.insert(*fingerprint, cloned_cred);
// Insert the new credential and add to the count of unique
// credentials we have. We assume that a duplicate
// credential will never be given. If we don't want to make
// this assumption, we could change the count from a u32 to
// a set of credential IDs and get the count as its length.
let count = match self.lox_credentials.get(fingerprint) {
Some((_cred, count)) => *count,
None => 0,
};
self.lox_credentials
.insert(*fingerprint, (cloned_cred, count + 1));
}
}
// Make a bunch of connections and submit positive reports if possible
async fn flood(&self, state: &State, bridges: &mut HashMap<[u8; 20], Bridge>) {
async fn flood(&self, config: &Config, bridges: &mut HashMap<[u8; 20], Bridge>) {
// Only do this if Flooding censor
if self.hides == Hides::Flooding {
if config.censor_hides == Hides::Flooding {
for fingerprint in &self.known_bridges {
// Only do this if we're blocking the bridge
if self.speed == Speed::Fast
|| self.speed == Speed::Lox && self.has_lox_cred(fingerprint)
|| self.speed == Speed::Random && self.delay_date <= get_date()
if config.censor_speed == Speed::Fast
|| config.censor_speed == Speed::Lox && self.has_lox_cred(fingerprint)
|| config.censor_speed == Speed::Random && self.delay_date <= get_date()
{
let bridge = bridges.get_mut(fingerprint).unwrap();
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let num_connections = rng.gen_range(1000..30000);
// Make a bunch of connections to the bridge
bridge.censor_flood(&self.country, num_connections);
bridge.censor_flood(num_connections);
// If we have a lv3+ credential, submit a bunch of
// positive reports
if self.has_lox_cred(fingerprint) {
let lox_pub = get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys);
let lox_pub = get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys);
for _ in 0..num_connections {
let pr = PositiveReport::from_lox_credential(
bridge.fingerprint,
None,
&self.lox_credentials.get(&bridge.fingerprint).unwrap(),
&self.lox_credentials.get(&bridge.fingerprint).unwrap().0,
lox_pub,
self.country.clone(),
config.country.clone(),
)
.unwrap();
state
config
.tp_net
.request("/positivereport".to_string(), pr.to_json().into_bytes())
.await;
@ -123,11 +127,11 @@ impl Censor {
}
}
// TODO: How do we want to do this? We don't want to stop blocking
// bridges the day after we start.
fn recompute_delay(&mut self) {
fn recompute_delay(&mut self, config: &Config) {
// Only do this if Random censor
if self.speed == Speed::Random && self.delay_date <= get_date() {
if config.censor_speed == Speed::Random
&& self.delay_date + config.censor_event_duration <= get_date()
{
// Compute new delay date
self.delay_date = {
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
@ -139,35 +143,34 @@ impl Censor {
pub async fn end_of_day_tasks(
&mut self,
state: &State,
config: &Config,
bridges: &mut HashMap<[u8; 20], Bridge>,
) {
if self.hides == Hides::Flooding
&& !(self.speed == Speed::Random && self.delay_date <= get_date())
if config.censor_hides == Hides::Flooding
&& !(config.censor_speed == Speed::Random && self.delay_date <= get_date())
{
self.flood(state, bridges).await;
self.flood(config, bridges).await;
}
// TODO: recompute_delay sometimes
//self.recompute_delay();
self.recompute_delay(config);
}
}
#[derive(PartialEq)]
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
pub enum Speed {
Fast,
Lox,
Random,
}
#[derive(PartialEq)]
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
pub enum Hides {
Overt,
Hiding,
Flooding,
}
#[derive(PartialEq)]
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
pub enum Totality {
Full,
Partial,

25
src/simulation/config.rs Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
use crate::simulation::censor;
use lox_cli::networking::*;
use lox_library::IssuerPubKey;
pub struct Config {
pub la_pubkeys: Vec<IssuerPubKey>,
pub la_net: HyperNet,
pub tp_net: HyperNet,
// Define censor behavior
pub censor_hides: censor::Hides,
pub censor_speed: censor::Speed,
pub censor_event_duration: u32,
pub censor_totality: censor::Totality,
pub censor_partial_blocking_percent: f64,
// We model only one country at a time because Lox assumes censors
// share information with each other.
pub country: String,
// Probability that a connection randomly fails, even though censor
// does not block the bridge
pub prob_connection_fails: f64,
pub prob_user_invites_friend: f64,
pub prob_user_is_censor: f64,
pub prob_user_submits_reports: f64,
}

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@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
use lox_cli::networking::*;
use lox_library::IssuerPubKey;
pub struct State {
pub la_pubkeys: Vec<IssuerPubKey>,
pub la_net: HyperNet,
pub tp_net: HyperNet,
// Probability that a connection randomly fails, even though censor
// does not block the bridge
pub prob_connection_fails: f64,
// Probability that if Alice invites Bob, Alice and Bob are in the same
// country. This is in *addition* to the regular probability that Bob is in
// that country by random selection.
pub prob_friend_in_same_country: f64,
pub prob_user_invites_friend: f64,
pub prob_user_is_censor: f64,
pub prob_user_submits_reports: f64,
pub probs_user_in_country: Vec<(String, f64)>,
// Do the censors talk to each other?
pub sharing: bool,
}

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@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ use crate::{
simulation::{
bridge::Bridge,
censor::{Censor, Hides::*, Speed::*, Totality::*},
state::State,
config::Config,
},
BridgeDistributor, COUNTRY_CODES,
BridgeDistributor,
};
use lox_cli::{networking::*, *};
use lox_library::{
@ -28,10 +28,7 @@ pub fn event_happens(probability: f64) -> bool {
pub struct User {
// Does this user cooperate with a censor?
censor: bool,
// 2-character country code
country: String,
is_censor: bool,
// The user always has a primary credential. If this credential's bucket is
// blocked, the user may replace it or temporarily hold two credentials
@ -47,46 +44,32 @@ pub struct User {
}
impl User {
pub async fn new(state: &State) -> Self {
pub async fn new(config: &Config) -> Self {
let cred = get_lox_credential(
&state.la_net,
&get_open_invitation(&state.la_net).await,
get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
&config.la_net,
&get_open_invitation(&config.la_net).await,
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await
.0;
// Probabilistically decide whether this user cooperates with a censor
let censor = event_happens(state.prob_user_is_censor);
let is_censor = event_happens(config.prob_user_is_censor);
// Probabilistically decide whether this user submits reports
let submits_reports = event_happens(state.prob_user_submits_reports);
// Probabilistically decide user's country
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let mut num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
let cc = {
let mut cc = String::default();
for (country, prob) in &state.probs_user_in_country {
let prob = *prob;
if num < prob {
cc = country.to_string();
break;
} else {
num -= prob;
}
}
cc
let submits_reports = if is_censor {
false
} else {
event_happens(config.prob_user_submits_reports)
};
assert!(COUNTRY_CODES.contains(cc.as_str()));
// Randomly determine how likely this user is to use bridges on
// a given day
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let prob_use_bridges = rng.gen_range(0.0..=1.0);
Self {
censor: censor,
country: cc,
is_censor,
primary_cred: cred,
secondary_cred: None,
submits_reports: submits_reports,
@ -95,55 +78,50 @@ impl User {
}
// TODO: This should probably return an actual error type
pub async fn invite(&mut self, state: &State) -> Result<Self, String> {
let etable = get_reachability_credential(&state.la_net).await;
pub async fn invite(&mut self, config: &Config, censor: &mut Censor) -> Result<Self, String> {
let etable = get_reachability_credential(&config.la_net).await;
let (new_cred, invite) = issue_invite(
&state.la_net,
&config.la_net,
&self.primary_cred,
&etable,
get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
get_reachability_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
get_invitation_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
get_reachability_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
get_invitation_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await;
self.primary_cred = new_cred;
if self.is_censor {
// Make sure censor has access to each bridge and each
// credential
let (bucket, _reachcred) = get_bucket(&config.la_net, &self.primary_cred).await;
for bl in bucket {
let fingerprint = bl.get_hashed_fingerprint();
censor.learn_bridge(&fingerprint);
censor.give_lox_cred(&fingerprint, &self.primary_cred);
}
}
let friend_cred = redeem_invite(
&state.la_net,
&config.la_net,
&invite,
get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
get_invitation_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
get_invitation_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await
.0;
// Probabilistically decide whether this user cooperates with a censor
// We do not influence this by the inviting friend's status. Anyone
// might have friends who are untrustworthy, and censors may invite
// non-censors to maintain an illusion of trustworthiness. Also, a
// "censor" user may not be knowingly helping a censor.
let censor = event_happens(state.prob_user_is_censor);
// If the inviting user is a censor, the invitee will also be a
// censor. If not, probabilistically decide.
let is_censor = if self.is_censor {
true
} else {
event_happens(config.prob_user_is_censor)
};
// Probabilistically decide whether this user submits reports
let submits_reports = event_happens(state.prob_user_submits_reports);
// Determine user's country
let cc = if event_happens(state.prob_friend_in_same_country) {
self.country.to_string()
let submits_reports = if is_censor {
false
} else {
// Probabilistically decide user's country
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let mut num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
let mut cc = String::default();
for (country, prob) in &state.probs_user_in_country {
let prob = *prob;
if num < prob {
cc = country.to_string();
break;
} else {
num -= prob;
}
}
cc
event_happens(config.prob_user_submits_reports)
};
// Randomly determine how likely this user is to use bridges on
@ -152,8 +130,7 @@ impl User {
let prob_use_bridges = rng.gen_range(0.0..=1.0);
Ok(Self {
censor: censor,
country: cc,
is_censor,
primary_cred: friend_cred,
secondary_cred: None,
submits_reports: submits_reports,
@ -162,21 +139,22 @@ impl User {
}
// Attempt to "connect" to the bridge, returns true if successful
pub fn connect(&self, state: &State, bridge: &mut Bridge, censor: &Censor) -> bool {
pub fn connect(&self, config: &Config, bridge: &mut Bridge, censor: &Censor) -> bool {
if censor.knows_bridge(&bridge.fingerprint) {
if censor.speed == Fast
|| censor.speed == Random && censor.delay_date <= get_date()
|| censor.speed == Lox && censor.has_lox_cred(&bridge.fingerprint)
if config.censor_speed == Fast
|| config.censor_speed == Random && censor.delay_date <= get_date()
|| config.censor_speed == Lox && censor.has_lox_cred(&bridge.fingerprint)
{
if censor.totality == Full
|| censor.totality == Partial && event_happens(censor.partial_blocking_percent)
|| censor.totality == Throttling
if config.censor_totality == Full
|| config.censor_totality == Partial
&& event_happens(censor.partial_blocking_percent)
|| config.censor_totality == Throttling
{
// If censor tries to hide its censorship or
// throttles rather than actually blocking, record a
// false connection
if censor.hides == Hiding || censor.totality == Throttling {
bridge.connect_total(&self.country);
if config.censor_hides == Hiding || config.censor_totality == Throttling {
bridge.connect_total();
}
// Return false because the connection failed
@ -186,19 +164,19 @@ impl User {
}
// Connection may randomly fail, without censor intervention
if event_happens(state.prob_connection_fails) {
if event_happens(config.prob_connection_fails) {
return false;
}
// If we haven't returned yet, the connection succeeded
bridge.connect_real(&self.country);
bridge.connect_real();
true
}
pub async fn send_negative_reports(state: &State, reports: Vec<NegativeReport>) {
pub async fn send_negative_reports(config: &Config, reports: Vec<NegativeReport>) {
let date = get_date();
let pubkey = serde_json::from_slice::<Option<PublicKey>>(
&state
&config
.tp_net
.request(
"/nrkey".to_string(),
@ -209,7 +187,7 @@ impl User {
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
for report in reports {
state
config
.tp_net
.request(
"/negativereport".to_string(),
@ -219,32 +197,44 @@ impl User {
}
}
pub async fn send_positive_reports(state: &State, reports: Vec<PositiveReport>) {
pub async fn send_positive_reports(config: &Config, reports: Vec<PositiveReport>) {
for report in reports {
state
config
.tp_net
.request("/positivereport".to_string(), report.to_json().into_bytes())
.await;
}
}
// User performs daily connection attempts, etc. and returns a
// vector of newly invited friends and a vector of fingerprints of
// successfully contacted bridges.
// TODO: The maps of bridges and censors should be Arc<Mutex<>> or
// something so we can parallelize this.
pub async fn daily_tasks(
&mut self,
state: &State,
config: &Config,
bridges: &mut HashMap<[u8; 20], Bridge>,
censors: &mut HashMap<String, Censor>,
censor: &mut Censor,
) -> Vec<User> {
if self.is_censor {
self.daily_tasks_censor(config, bridges, censor).await
} else {
self.daily_tasks_non_censor(config, bridges, censor).await
}
}
// User performs daily connection attempts, etc. and returns a
// vector of newly invited friends.
// TODO: The map of bridges and the censor should be Arc<Mutex<>>
// or something so we can parallelize this.
pub async fn daily_tasks_non_censor(
&mut self,
config: &Config,
bridges: &mut HashMap<[u8; 20], Bridge>,
censor: &mut Censor,
) -> Vec<User> {
// Probabilistically decide if the user should use bridges today
if event_happens(self.prob_use_bridges) {
// Download bucket to see if bridge is still reachable. (We
// assume that this step can be done even if the user can't
// actually talk to the LA.)
let (bucket, reachcred) = get_bucket(&state.la_net, &self.primary_cred).await;
let (bucket, reachcred) = get_bucket(&config.la_net, &self.primary_cred).await;
let level = scalar_u32(&self.primary_cred.trust_level).unwrap();
// Make sure each bridge in bucket is in the global bridges set
@ -254,30 +244,15 @@ impl User {
let bridge = Bridge::from_bridge_line(&bridgeline);
bridges.insert(bridgeline.get_hashed_fingerprint(), bridge);
}
// Also, if this user cooperates with censors, make sure
// each applicable censor knows about their bridges.
if self.censor {
if state.sharing {
for c in censors.values_mut() {
if !c.knows_bridge(&bridgeline.get_hashed_fingerprint()) {
c.learn_bridge(&bridgeline.get_hashed_fingerprint());
}
}
} else {
let censor = censors.get_mut(&self.country).unwrap();
if !censor.knows_bridge(&bridgeline.get_hashed_fingerprint()) {
censor.learn_bridge(&bridgeline.get_hashed_fingerprint());
}
}
}
}
}
// Can we level up the main credential?
let can_level_up = reachcred.is_some()
&& (level == 0
&& eligible_for_trust_promotion(&state.la_net, &self.primary_cred).await
|| level > 0 && eligible_for_level_up(&state.la_net, &self.primary_cred).await);
&& eligible_for_trust_promotion(&config.la_net, &self.primary_cred).await
|| level > 0
&& eligible_for_level_up(&config.la_net, &self.primary_cred).await);
// Can we migrate the main credential?
let can_migrate = reachcred.is_none() && level >= MIN_TRUST_LEVEL;
@ -285,18 +260,18 @@ impl User {
// Can we level up the secondary credential?
let mut second_level_up = false;
// Attempt to connect to each bridge
let mut failed = Vec::<BridgeLine>::new();
let mut succeeded = Vec::<BridgeLine>::new();
// Try to connect to each bridge
for i in 0..bucket.len() {
// At level 0, we only have 1 bridge
if bucket[i] != BridgeLine::default() {
if self.connect(
&state,
&config,
bridges
.get_mut(&bucket[i].get_hashed_fingerprint())
.unwrap(),
&censors.get(&self.country).unwrap(),
&censor,
) {
succeeded.push(bucket[i]);
} else {
@ -304,15 +279,18 @@ impl User {
}
}
}
// If we were not able to connect to any bridges, get a
// second credential
let second_cred = if succeeded.len() < 1 {
if self.secondary_cred.is_some() {
std::mem::replace(&mut self.secondary_cred, None)
} else {
// Get new credential
let cred = get_lox_credential(
&state.la_net,
&get_open_invitation(&state.la_net).await,
get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
&config.la_net,
&get_open_invitation(&config.la_net).await,
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await
.0;
@ -326,7 +304,7 @@ impl User {
if second_cred.is_some() {
let second_cred = second_cred.as_ref().unwrap();
let (second_bucket, second_reachcred) =
get_bucket(&state.la_net, &second_cred).await;
get_bucket(&config.la_net, &second_cred).await;
for bridgeline in second_bucket {
if bridgeline != BridgeLine::default() {
if !bridges.contains_key(&bridgeline.get_hashed_fingerprint()) {
@ -335,16 +313,17 @@ impl User {
Bridge::from_bridge_line(&bridgeline),
);
}
// Attempt to connect to second cred's bridge
if self.connect(
&state,
&config,
bridges
.get_mut(&bridgeline.get_hashed_fingerprint())
.unwrap(),
&censors.get(&self.country).unwrap(),
censor,
) {
succeeded.push(bridgeline);
if second_reachcred.is_some()
&& eligible_for_trust_promotion(&state.la_net, &second_cred).await
&& eligible_for_trust_promotion(&config.la_net, &second_cred).await
{
second_level_up = true;
}
@ -357,11 +336,12 @@ impl User {
let mut negative_reports = Vec::<NegativeReport>::new();
let mut positive_reports = Vec::<PositiveReport>::new();
if self.submits_reports {
for bridgeline in &failed {
negative_reports.push(NegativeReport::from_bridgeline(
*bridgeline,
self.country.to_string(),
config.country.to_string(),
BridgeDistributor::Lox,
));
}
@ -372,8 +352,8 @@ impl User {
bridgeline.get_hashed_fingerprint(),
None,
&self.primary_cred,
get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
self.country.to_string(),
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
config.country.to_string(),
)
.unwrap(),
);
@ -385,54 +365,68 @@ impl User {
// we do assume the user can contact the LA somehow, so
// let's just allow it.
if can_level_up {
let cred = level_up(
&state.la_net,
&self.primary_cred,
&reachcred.unwrap(),
get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
get_reachability_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
)
.await;
let cred = if level == 0 {
trust_migration(
&config.la_net,
&self.primary_cred,
&trust_promotion(
&config.la_net,
&self.primary_cred,
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await,
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
get_migration_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await
} else {
level_up(
&config.la_net,
&self.primary_cred,
&reachcred.unwrap(),
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
get_reachability_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await
};
self.primary_cred = cred;
self.secondary_cred = None;
if self.censor {
// Make sure censor has access to each bridge and
// each credential
let censor = censors.get_mut(&self.country).unwrap();
let (bucket, reachcred) = get_bucket(&state.la_net, &self.primary_cred).await;
for bl in bucket {
censor.learn_bridge(&bl.get_hashed_fingerprint());
censor.give_lox_cred(&bl.get_hashed_fingerprint(), &self.primary_cred);
}
}
}
// We favor starting over at level 1 to migrating
else if second_level_up {
// We favor starting over at level 1 to migrating to level
// 1, but if we have a level 4 credential for a bridge that
// hasn't been marked blocked, save the credential so we can
// migrate to a level 2 cred. Note that second_level_up is
// only true if we were unable to connect with bridges from
// our primary credential.
else if second_level_up && (level <= MIN_TRUST_LEVEL || reachcred.is_none()) {
let second_cred = second_cred.as_ref().unwrap();
let cred = trust_migration(
&state.la_net,
&config.la_net,
&second_cred,
&trust_promotion(&state.la_net, &second_cred, get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys))
.await,
get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
get_migration_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
&trust_promotion(
&config.la_net,
&second_cred,
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await,
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
get_migration_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await;
self.primary_cred = cred;
self.secondary_cred = None;
} else if can_migrate {
let cred = blockage_migration(
&state.la_net,
&config.la_net,
&self.primary_cred,
&check_blockage(
&state.la_net,
&config.la_net,
&self.primary_cred,
get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await,
get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
get_migration_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
get_migration_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await;
self.primary_cred = cred;
@ -446,18 +440,18 @@ impl User {
}
if negative_reports.len() > 0 {
Self::send_negative_reports(&state, negative_reports).await;
Self::send_negative_reports(&config, negative_reports).await;
}
if positive_reports.len() > 0 {
Self::send_positive_reports(&state, positive_reports).await;
Self::send_positive_reports(&config, positive_reports).await;
}
// Invite friends if applicable
let invitations = scalar_u32(&self.primary_cred.invites_remaining).unwrap();
let mut new_friends = Vec::<User>::new();
for _i in 0..invitations {
if event_happens(state.prob_user_invites_friend) {
match self.invite(&state).await {
if event_happens(config.prob_user_invites_friend) {
match self.invite(&config, censor).await {
Ok(friend) => {
// You really shouldn't push your friends,
// especially new ones whose boundaries you
@ -476,4 +470,127 @@ impl User {
Vec::<User>::new()
}
}
// User cooperates with censor and performs daily tasks to try to
// learn more bridges.
pub async fn daily_tasks_censor(
&mut self,
config: &Config,
bridges: &mut HashMap<[u8; 20], Bridge>,
censor: &mut Censor,
) -> Vec<User> {
// Download bucket to see if bridge is still reachable and if we
// have any new bridges
let (bucket, reachcred) = get_bucket(&config.la_net, &self.primary_cred).await;
let level = scalar_u32(&self.primary_cred.trust_level).unwrap();
// Make sure each bridge is in global bridges set and known by
// censor
for bridgeline in bucket {
if bridgeline != BridgeLine::default() {
if !bridges.contains_key(&bridgeline.get_hashed_fingerprint()) {
let bridge = Bridge::from_bridge_line(&bridgeline);
bridges.insert(bridgeline.get_hashed_fingerprint(), bridge);
}
censor.learn_bridge(&bridgeline.get_hashed_fingerprint());
}
}
// Censor user tries to level up their primary credential
if reachcred.is_some() {
if level == 0 && eligible_for_trust_promotion(&config.la_net, &self.primary_cred).await
|| level > 0 && eligible_for_level_up(&config.la_net, &self.primary_cred).await
{
let new_cred = if level == 0 {
trust_migration(
&config.la_net,
&self.primary_cred,
&trust_promotion(
&config.la_net,
&self.primary_cred,
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await,
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
get_migration_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await
} else {
level_up(
&config.la_net,
&self.primary_cred,
&reachcred.unwrap(),
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
get_reachability_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await
};
self.primary_cred = new_cred;
let (bucket, _reachcred) = get_bucket(&config.la_net, &self.primary_cred).await;
// Make sure each bridge is in global bridges set and
// known by censor
for bl in bucket {
let fingerprint = bl.get_hashed_fingerprint();
if !bridges.contains_key(&fingerprint) {
let bridge = Bridge::from_bridge_line(&bl);
bridges.insert(fingerprint, bridge);
}
censor.learn_bridge(&fingerprint);
censor.give_lox_cred(&fingerprint, &self.primary_cred);
}
}
} else {
// LA has identified this bucket as blocked. This change
// will not be reverted, so replace the primary credential
// with a new level 0 credential and work on gaining trust
// for that one.
let (new_cred, bl) = get_lox_credential(
&config.la_net,
&get_open_invitation(&config.la_net).await,
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await;
let fingerprint = bl.get_hashed_fingerprint();
if !bridges.contains_key(&fingerprint) {
let bridge = Bridge::from_bridge_line(&bl);
bridges.insert(fingerprint, bridge);
}
censor.learn_bridge(&fingerprint);
// Censor doesn't want new_cred yet
self.primary_cred = new_cred;
}
// Separately from primary credential, censor user requests a
// new secondary credential each day just to block the
// open-entry bridges. This is stored but not reused.
let (_new_cred, bl) = get_lox_credential(
&config.la_net,
&get_open_invitation(&config.la_net).await,
get_lox_pub(&config.la_pubkeys),
)
.await;
let fingerprint = bl.get_hashed_fingerprint();
if !bridges.contains_key(&fingerprint) {
let bridge = Bridge::from_bridge_line(&bl);
bridges.insert(fingerprint, bridge);
}
censor.learn_bridge(&fingerprint);
// Censor doesn't want new_cred. User doesn't actually use
// secondary_cred, so don't store it.
// Censor user invites as many censor friends as possible
let invitations = scalar_u32(&self.primary_cred.invites_remaining).unwrap();
let mut new_friends = Vec::<User>::new();
for _ in 0..invitations {
match self.invite(&config, censor).await {
Ok(friend) => {
new_friends.push(friend);
}
Err(e) => {
println!("{}", e);
}
}
}
new_friends
}
}