/*! A module for the protocol for a user to request the issuing of an
Invitation credential they can pass to someone they know.

They are allowed to do this as long as their current Lox credentials has
a non-zero "invites_remaining" attribute (which will be decreased by
one), and they have a Bucket Reachability credential for their current
bucket and today's date.  (Such credentials are placed daily in the
encrypted bridge table.)

The user presents their current Lox credential:
- id: revealed
- bucket: blinded
- trust_level: blinded
- level_since: blinded
- invites_remaining: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's not zero
- blockages: blinded

and a Bucket Reachability credential:
- date: revealed to be today
- bucket: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's the same as in the Lox
  credential above

and a new Lox credential to be issued:

- id: jointly chosen by the user and BA
- bucket: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's the same as in the Lox
  credential above
- trust_level: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's the same as in the
  Lox credential above
- level_since: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's the same as in the
  Lox credential above
- invites_remaining: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's one less than
  the number in the Lox credential above
- blockages: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's the same as in the
  Lox credential above

and a new Invitation credential to be issued:

- inv_id: jointly chosen by the user and BA
- date: revealed to be today
- bucket: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's the same as in the Lox
  credential above
- blockages: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's the same as in the Lox
  credential above

*/

use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoBasepointTable;
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
use curve25519_dalek::traits::IsIdentity;

use zkp::CompactProof;
use zkp::ProofError;
use zkp::Transcript;

use super::super::cred;
use super::super::dup_filter::SeenType;
use super::super::{pt_dbl, scalar_dbl, scalar_u32};
use super::super::{BridgeAuth, IssuerPubKey};
use super::super::{CMZ_A, CMZ_A_TABLE, CMZ_B, CMZ_B_TABLE};

pub struct Request {
    // Fields for blind showing the Lox credential
    P: RistrettoPoint,
    id: Scalar,
    CBucket: RistrettoPoint,
    CLevel: RistrettoPoint,
    CSince: RistrettoPoint,
    CInvRemain: RistrettoPoint,
    CBlockages: RistrettoPoint,
    CQ: RistrettoPoint,

    // Fields for blind showing the Bucket Reachability credential
    P_reach: RistrettoPoint,
    CBucket_reach: RistrettoPoint,
    CQ_reach: RistrettoPoint,

    // Fields for user blinding of the Lox credential to be issued
    D: RistrettoPoint,
    EncIdClient: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    EncBucket: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    EncLevel: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    EncSince: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    EncInvRemain: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    EncBlockages: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),

    // Fields for user blinding of the Inivtation credential to be
    // issued
    EncInvIdClient: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    // The bucket and blockages attributes in the Invitation credential
    // issuing protocol can just reuse the exact encryptions as for the
    // Lox credential issuing protocol above.

    // The combined ZKP
    piUser: CompactProof,
}

#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct State {
    d: Scalar,
    D: RistrettoPoint,
    EncIdClient: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    EncBucket: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    EncLevel: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    EncSince: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    EncInvRemain: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    EncBlockages: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    EncInvIdClient: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    id_client: Scalar,
    bucket: Scalar,
    level: Scalar,
    since: Scalar,
    invremain: Scalar,
    blockages: Scalar,
    inv_id_client: Scalar,
}

pub struct Response {
    // The fields for the new Lox credential; the new invites_remaining
    // is one less than the old value, so we don't have to include it
    // here explicitly
    P: RistrettoPoint,
    EncQ: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
    id_server: Scalar,
    TId: RistrettoPoint,
    TBucket: RistrettoPoint,
    TLevel: RistrettoPoint,
    TSince: RistrettoPoint,
    TInvRemain: RistrettoPoint,
    TBlockages: RistrettoPoint,
    inv_id_server: Scalar,
    TInvId: RistrettoPoint,

    // The ZKP
    piBlindIssue: CompactProof,
}

define_proof! {
    requestproof,
    "Issue Invite Request",
    (bucket, level, since, invremain, blockages, zbucket, zlevel,
     zsince, zinvremain, zblockages, negzQ,
     zbucket_reach, negzQ_reach,
     d, eid_client, ebucket, elevel, esince, einvremain, eblockages, id_client,
     inv_id_client, einv_id_client,
     invremain_inverse, zinvremain_inverse),
    (P, CBucket, CLevel, CSince, CInvRemain, CBlockages, V, Xbucket,
     Xlevel, Xsince, Xinvremain, Xblockages,
     P_reach, CBucket_reach, V_reach, Xbucket_reach,
     D, EncIdClient0, EncIdClient1, EncBucket0, EncBucket1,
     EncLevel0, EncLevel1, EncSince0, EncSince1,
     EncInvRemain0, EncInvRemain1_plus_B, EncBlockages0, EncBlockages1,
     EncInvIdClient0, EncInvIdClient1),
    (A, B):
    // Blind showing of the Lox credential
    CBucket = (bucket*P + zbucket*A),
    CLevel = (level*P + zlevel*A),
    CSince = (since*P + zsince*A),
    CInvRemain = (invremain*P + zinvremain*A),
    CBlockages = (blockages*P + zblockages*A),
    // Proof that invremain is not 0
    P = (invremain_inverse*CInvRemain + zinvremain_inverse*A),
    // Blind showing of the Bucket Reachability credential; note the
    // same bucket is used in the proof
    CBucket_reach = (bucket*P_reach + zbucket_reach*A),
    // User blinding of the Lox credential to be issued
    D = (d*B),
    EncIdClient0 = (eid_client*B),
    EncIdClient1 = (id_client*B + eid_client*D),
    EncBucket0 = (ebucket*B),
    EncBucket1 = (bucket*B + ebucket*D),
    EncLevel0 = (elevel*B),
    EncLevel1 = (level*B + elevel*D),
    EncSince0 = (esince*B),
    EncSince1 = (since*B + esince*D),
    EncInvRemain0 = (einvremain*B),
    EncInvRemain1_plus_B = (invremain*B + einvremain*D),
    EncBlockages0 = (eblockages*B),
    EncBlockages1 = (blockages*B + eblockages*D),
    // User blinding of the Invitation to be issued
    EncInvIdClient0 = (einv_id_client*B),
    EncInvIdClient1 = (inv_id_client*B + einv_id_client*D)
}

pub fn request(
    lox_cred: &cred::Lox,
    reach_cred: &cred::BucketReachability,
    lox_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
    reach_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
    today: u32,
) -> Result<(Request, State), ProofError> {
    let A: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_A;
    let B: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_B;
    let Atable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_A_TABLE;
    let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;

    // Ensure the credential can be correctly shown: it must be the case
    // that invites_remaining not be 0
    if lox_cred.invites_remaining == Scalar::zero() {
        return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
    }
    // The buckets in the Lox and Bucket Reachability credentials have
    // to match
    if lox_cred.bucket != reach_cred.bucket {
        return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
    }
    // The Bucket Reachability credential has to be dated today
    let reach_date: u32 = match scalar_u32(&reach_cred.date) {
        Some(v) => v,
        None => return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure),
    };
    if reach_date != today {
        return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
    }
    // The new invites_remaining
    let new_invites_remaining = &lox_cred.invites_remaining - Scalar::one();

    // Blind showing the Lox credential

    // Reblind P and Q
    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
    let t = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let P = t * lox_cred.P;
    let Q = t * lox_cred.Q;

    // Form Pedersen commitments to the blinded attributes
    let zbucket = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let zlevel = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let zsince = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let zinvremain = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let zblockages = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let CBucket = lox_cred.bucket * P + &zbucket * Atable;
    let CLevel = lox_cred.bucket * P + &zlevel * Atable;
    let CSince = lox_cred.level_since * P + &zsince * Atable;
    let CInvRemain = lox_cred.invites_remaining * P + &zinvremain * Atable;
    let CBlockages = lox_cred.blockages * P + &zblockages * Atable;

    // Form a Pedersen commitment to the MAC Q
    // We flip the sign of zQ from that of the Hyphae paper so that
    // the ZKP has a "+" instead of a "-", as that's what the zkp
    // macro supports.
    let negzQ = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let CQ = Q - &negzQ * Atable;

    // Compute the "error factor"
    let V = zbucket * lox_pub.X[2]
        + zlevel * lox_pub.X[3]
        + zsince * lox_pub.X[4]
        + zinvremain * lox_pub.X[5]
        + zblockages * lox_pub.X[6]
        + &negzQ * Atable;

    // Blind showing the Bucket Reachability credential

    // Reblind P and Q
    let t_reach = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let P_reach = t_reach * reach_cred.P;
    let Q_reach = t_reach * reach_cred.Q;

    // Form Pedersen commitments to the blinded attributes
    let zbucket_reach = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let CBucket_reach = reach_cred.bucket * P_reach + &zbucket_reach * Atable;

    // Form a Pedersen commitment to the MAC Q
    // We flip the sign of zQ from that of the Hyphae paper so that
    // the ZKP has a "+" instead of a "-", as that's what the zkp
    // macro supports.
    let negzQ_reach = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let CQ_reach = Q_reach - &negzQ_reach * Atable;

    // Compute the "error factor"
    let V_reach = zbucket_reach * reach_pub.X[2] + &negzQ_reach * Atable;

    // User blinding for the Lox certificate to be issued

    // Pick an ElGamal keypair
    let d = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let D = &d * Btable;

    // Pick a random client component of the id
    let id_client = Scalar::random(&mut rng);

    // Encrypt it (times the basepoint B) to the ElGamal public key D we
    // just created
    let eid_client = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let EncIdClient = (&eid_client * Btable, &id_client * Btable + eid_client * D);

    // Encrypt the other blinded fields (times B) to D as well
    let ebucket = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let EncBucket = (&ebucket * Btable, &lox_cred.bucket * Btable + ebucket * D);
    let elevel = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let EncLevel = (
        &elevel * Btable,
        &lox_cred.trust_level * Btable + elevel * D,
    );
    let esince = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let EncSince = (
        &esince * Btable,
        &lox_cred.level_since * Btable + esince * D,
    );
    let einvremain = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let EncInvRemain = (
        &einvremain * Btable,
        &new_invites_remaining * Btable + einvremain * D,
    );
    let eblockages = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let EncBlockages = (
        &eblockages * Btable,
        &lox_cred.blockages * Btable + eblockages * D,
    );

    // User blinding for the Invitation certificate to be issued

    // Pick a random client component of the id
    let inv_id_client = Scalar::random(&mut rng);

    // Encrypt it (times the basepoint B) to the ElGamal public key D we
    // just created
    let einv_id_client = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
    let EncInvIdClient = (
        &einv_id_client * Btable,
        &id_client * Btable + einv_id_client * D,
    );

    // The proof that invites_remaining is not zero.  We prove this by
    // demonstrating that we know its inverse.
    let invremain_inverse = &lox_cred.invites_remaining.invert();

    let zinvremain_inverse = -zinvremain * invremain_inverse;

    // So now invremain_inverse * CInvRemain + zinvremain_inverse * A = P

    // Construct the proof
    let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"issue invite request");
    let piUser = requestproof::prove_compact(
        &mut transcript,
        requestproof::ProveAssignments {
            A: &A,
            B: &B,
            P: &P,
            CBucket: &CBucket,
            CLevel: &CLevel,
            CSince: &CSince,
            CInvRemain: &CInvRemain,
            CBlockages: &CBlockages,
            V: &V,
            Xbucket: &lox_pub.X[2],
            Xlevel: &lox_pub.X[3],
            Xsince: &lox_pub.X[4],
            Xinvremain: &lox_pub.X[5],
            Xblockages: &lox_pub.X[6],
            P_reach: &P_reach,
            CBucket_reach: &CBucket_reach,
            V_reach: &V_reach,
            Xbucket_reach: &reach_pub.X[2],
            D: &D,
            EncIdClient0: &EncIdClient.0,
            EncIdClient1: &EncIdClient.1,
            EncBucket0: &EncBucket.0,
            EncBucket1: &EncBucket.1,
            EncLevel0: &EncLevel.0,
            EncLevel1: &EncLevel.1,
            EncSince0: &EncSince.0,
            EncSince1: &EncSince.1,
            EncInvRemain0: &EncInvRemain.0,
            EncInvRemain1_plus_B: &(EncInvRemain.1 + B),
            EncBlockages0: &EncBlockages.0,
            EncBlockages1: &EncBlockages.1,
            EncInvIdClient0: &EncInvIdClient.0,
            EncInvIdClient1: &EncInvIdClient.1,
            bucket: &lox_cred.bucket,
            level: &lox_cred.trust_level,
            since: &lox_cred.level_since,
            invremain: &lox_cred.invites_remaining,
            blockages: &lox_cred.blockages,
            zbucket: &zbucket,
            zlevel: &zlevel,
            zsince: &zsince,
            zinvremain: &zinvremain,
            zblockages: &zblockages,
            negzQ: &negzQ,
            zbucket_reach: &zbucket_reach,
            negzQ_reach: &negzQ_reach,
            d: &d,
            eid_client: &eid_client,
            ebucket: &ebucket,
            elevel: &elevel,
            esince: &esince,
            einvremain: &einvremain,
            eblockages: &eblockages,
            id_client: &id_client,
            inv_id_client: &inv_id_client,
            einv_id_client: &einv_id_client,
            invremain_inverse: &invremain_inverse,
            zinvremain_inverse: &zinvremain_inverse,
        },
    )
    .0;

    Ok((
        Request {
            P,
            id: lox_cred.id,
            CBucket,
            CLevel,
            CSince,
            CInvRemain,
            CBlockages,
            CQ,
            P_reach,
            CBucket_reach,
            CQ_reach,
            D,
            EncIdClient,
            EncBucket,
            EncLevel,
            EncSince,
            EncInvRemain,
            EncBlockages,
            EncInvIdClient,
            piUser,
        },
        State {
            d,
            D,
            EncIdClient,
            EncBucket,
            EncLevel,
            EncSince,
            EncInvRemain,
            EncBlockages,
            EncInvIdClient,
            id_client,
            bucket: lox_cred.bucket,
            level: lox_cred.trust_level,
            since: lox_cred.level_since,
            invremain: new_invites_remaining,
            blockages: lox_cred.blockages,
            inv_id_client,
        },
    ))
}