Complete the redeem invitation protocol
This commit is contained in:
parent
dd505ccfd7
commit
b0290f5480
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@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ edition = "2018"
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[dependencies]
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[dependencies]
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curve25519-dalek = { package = "curve25519-dalek-ng", version = "3", default-features = false, features = ["serde", "std"] }
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curve25519-dalek = { package = "curve25519-dalek-ng", version = "3", default-features = false, features = ["serde", "std"] }
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ed25519-dalek = "1"
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ed25519-dalek = "1"
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zkp = { version = "0.8", features = ["debug-transcript"] }
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# zkp = { version = "0.8", features = ["debug-transcript"] }
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# zkp = "0.8"
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zkp = "0.8"
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bincode = "1"
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bincode = "1"
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rand = "0.7"
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rand = "0.7"
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serde = "1"
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serde = "1"
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@ -206,8 +206,10 @@ pub struct BridgeAuth {
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/// Duplicate filter for open invitations
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/// Duplicate filter for open invitations
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openinv_filter: dup_filter::DupFilter<Scalar>,
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openinv_filter: dup_filter::DupFilter<Scalar>,
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/// Duplicate filter for credential ids
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/// Duplicate filter for Lox credential ids
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id_filter: dup_filter::DupFilter<Scalar>,
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id_filter: dup_filter::DupFilter<Scalar>,
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/// Duplicate filter for Invitation credential ids
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inv_id_filter: dup_filter::DupFilter<Scalar>,
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/// Duplicate filter for trust promotions (from untrusted level 0 to
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/// Duplicate filter for trust promotions (from untrusted level 0 to
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/// trusted level 1)
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/// trusted level 1)
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trust_promotion_filter: dup_filter::DupFilter<Scalar>,
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trust_promotion_filter: dup_filter::DupFilter<Scalar>,
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@ -246,6 +248,7 @@ impl BridgeAuth {
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migration_table: Default::default(),
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migration_table: Default::default(),
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openinv_filter: Default::default(),
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openinv_filter: Default::default(),
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id_filter: Default::default(),
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id_filter: Default::default(),
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inv_id_filter: Default::default(),
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trust_promotion_filter: Default::default(),
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trust_promotion_filter: Default::default(),
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time_offset: time::Duration::zero(),
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time_offset: time::Duration::zero(),
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}
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}
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@ -729,8 +729,8 @@ impl BridgeAuth {
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- req.CQ_reach;
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- req.CQ_reach;
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// Recompute CG0 using Horner's method
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// Recompute CG0 using Horner's method
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let unt: Scalar = LEVEL_INTERVAL[level].into();
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let interval: Scalar = LEVEL_INTERVAL[level].into();
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let CG0prime = (today - unt) * req.P
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let CG0prime = (today - interval) * req.P
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- req.CSince
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- req.CSince
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- pt_dbl(
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- pt_dbl(
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&(pt_dbl(
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&(pt_dbl(
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@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ pub const INVITATION_EXPIRY: u32 = 15;
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pub struct Request {
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pub struct Request {
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// Fields for showing the Invitation credential
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// Fields for showing the Invitation credential
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P: RistrettoPoint,
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P: RistrettoPoint,
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id: Scalar,
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inv_id: Scalar,
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CDate: RistrettoPoint,
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CDate: RistrettoPoint,
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CBucket: RistrettoPoint,
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CBucket: RistrettoPoint,
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CBlockages: RistrettoPoint,
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CBlockages: RistrettoPoint,
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@ -138,6 +138,34 @@ define_proof! {
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// + 8*CG3) as its value of CG0.
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// + 8*CG3) as its value of CG0.
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}
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}
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define_proof! {
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blindissue,
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"Redeem Invite Issuing",
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(x0, x0tilde, xid, xbucket, xlevel, xsince, xblockages,
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s, b, tid, tbucket, tblockages),
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(P, EncQ0, EncQ1, X0, Xid, Xbucket, Xlevel, Xsince, Xblockages,
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Psince, TId, TBucket, TBlockages,
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D, EncId0, EncId1, EncBucket0, EncBucket1, EncBlockages0, EncBlockages1),
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(A, B):
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Xid = (xid*A),
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Xbucket = (xbucket*A),
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Xlevel = (xlevel*A),
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Xsince = (xsince*A),
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Xblockages = (xblockages*A),
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X0 = (x0*B + x0tilde*A),
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P = (b*B),
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TId = (b*Xid),
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TId = (tid*A),
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TBucket = (b*Xbucket),
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TBucket = (tbucket*A),
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TBlockages = (b*Xblockages),
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TBlockages = (tblockages*A),
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EncQ0 = (s*B + tid*EncId0 + tbucket*EncBucket0 + tblockages*EncBlockages0),
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// level=1 (so Plevel = P) and invremain=0 (so the term is omitted)
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EncQ1 = (s*D + tid*EncId1 + tbucket*EncBucket1
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+ tblockages*EncBlockages1 + x0*P + xlevel*P + xsince*Psince)
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}
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pub fn request(
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pub fn request(
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inv_cred: &cred::Invitation,
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inv_cred: &cred::Invitation,
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invitation_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
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invitation_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
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@ -234,9 +262,9 @@ pub fn request(
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let wg3 = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let wg3 = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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// Compute zg0 to cancel things out as
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// Compute zg0 to cancel things out as
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// zg0 = -(zdate + 2*zg1 + 4*zg2 + 8*zg3)
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// zg0 = zdate - (2*zg1 + 4*zg2 + 8*zg3)
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// but use Horner's method
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// but use Horner's method
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let zg0 = -(scalar_dbl(&(scalar_dbl(&(scalar_dbl(&zg3) + zg2)) + zg1)) + zdate);
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let zg0 = zdate - scalar_dbl(&(scalar_dbl(&(scalar_dbl(&zg3) + zg2)) + zg1));
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let yg0 = wg0 + g0 * zg0;
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let yg0 = wg0 + g0 * zg0;
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let yg1 = wg1 + g1 * zg1;
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let yg1 = wg1 + g1 * zg1;
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@ -318,7 +346,7 @@ pub fn request(
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Ok((
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Ok((
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Request {
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Request {
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P,
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P,
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id: inv_cred.inv_id,
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inv_id: inv_cred.inv_id,
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CDate,
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CDate,
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CBucket,
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CBucket,
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CBlockages,
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CBlockages,
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@ -348,3 +376,240 @@ pub fn request(
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},
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},
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))
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))
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}
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}
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impl BridgeAuth {
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/// Receive a redeem invite request
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pub fn handle_redeem_invite(&mut self, req: Request) -> Result<Response, ProofError> {
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let A: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_A;
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let B: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_B;
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let Atable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_A_TABLE;
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let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
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if req.P.is_identity() {
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return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
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}
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let today: Scalar = self.today().into();
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// Recompute the "error factor" using knowledge of our own
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// (the issuer's) private key instead of knowledge of the
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// hidden attributes
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let Vprime = (self.invitation_priv.x[0] + self.invitation_priv.x[1] * req.inv_id) * req.P
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+ self.invitation_priv.x[2] * req.CDate
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+ self.invitation_priv.x[3] * req.CBucket
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+ self.invitation_priv.x[4] * req.CBlockages
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- req.CQ;
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// Recompute CG0 using Horner's method
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let expiry: Scalar = INVITATION_EXPIRY.into();
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let CG0prime = (expiry - today) * req.P + req.CDate
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- pt_dbl(&(pt_dbl(&(pt_dbl(&req.CG3) + req.CG2)) + req.CG1));
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// Verify the ZKP
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let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"redeem invite request");
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requestproof::verify_compact(
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&req.piUser,
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&mut transcript,
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requestproof::VerifyAssignments {
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A: &A.compress(),
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B: &B.compress(),
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P: &req.P.compress(),
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CDate: &req.CDate.compress(),
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CBucket: &req.CBucket.compress(),
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CBlockages: &req.CBlockages.compress(),
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V: &Vprime.compress(),
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Xdate: &self.invitation_pub.X[2].compress(),
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Xbucket: &self.invitation_pub.X[3].compress(),
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Xblockages: &self.invitation_pub.X[4].compress(),
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D: &req.D.compress(),
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EncIdClient0: &req.EncIdClient.0.compress(),
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EncIdClient1: &req.EncIdClient.1.compress(),
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EncBucket0: &req.EncBucket.0.compress(),
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EncBucket1: &req.EncBucket.1.compress(),
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EncBlockages0: &req.EncBlockages.0.compress(),
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EncBlockages1: &req.EncBlockages.1.compress(),
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CG0: &CG0prime.compress(),
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CG1: &req.CG1.compress(),
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CG2: &req.CG2.compress(),
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CG3: &req.CG3.compress(),
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CG0sq: &req.CG0sq.compress(),
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CG1sq: &req.CG1sq.compress(),
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CG2sq: &req.CG2sq.compress(),
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CG3sq: &req.CG3sq.compress(),
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},
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)?;
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// Ensure the id has not been seen before, and add it to the
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// invite id seen list.
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if self.inv_id_filter.filter(&req.inv_id) == SeenType::Seen {
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return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
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}
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// Blind issuing of the new Lox credential
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// Choose a random server id component to add to the client's
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// (blinded) id component
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let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
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let id_server = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let EncId = (req.EncIdClient.0, req.EncIdClient.1 + &id_server * Btable);
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// The trust level for invitees is always 1
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let level = Scalar::one();
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// The invites remaining for invitees is always 0 (as
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// appropriate for trust level 1), so we don't need to actually
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// construct it
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// Compute the MAC on the visible attributes
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let b = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let P = &b * Btable;
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let QHc =
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(self.lox_priv.x[0] + self.lox_priv.x[3] * level + self.lox_priv.x[4] * today) * P;
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// El Gamal encrypt it to the public key req.D
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let s = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let EncQHc = (&s * Btable, QHc + s * req.D);
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// Homomorphically compute the part of the MAC corresponding to
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// the blinded attributes
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let tid = self.lox_priv.x[1] * b;
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let TId = &tid * Atable;
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let EncQId = (tid * EncId.0, tid * EncId.1);
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let tbucket = self.lox_priv.x[2] * b;
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let TBucket = &tbucket * Atable;
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let EncQBucket = (tbucket * req.EncBucket.0, tbucket * req.EncBucket.1);
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let tblockages = self.lox_priv.x[6] * b;
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let TBlockages = &tblockages * Atable;
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let EncQBlockages = (
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tblockages * req.EncBlockages.0,
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tblockages * req.EncBlockages.1,
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);
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let EncQ = (
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EncQHc.0 + EncQId.0 + EncQBucket.0 + EncQBlockages.0,
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EncQHc.1 + EncQId.1 + EncQBucket.1 + EncQBlockages.1,
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);
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let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"redeem invite issuing");
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let piBlindIssue = blindissue::prove_compact(
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&mut transcript,
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blindissue::ProveAssignments {
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A: &A,
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B: &B,
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P: &P,
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EncQ0: &EncQ.0,
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EncQ1: &EncQ.1,
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X0: &self.lox_pub.X[0],
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Xid: &self.lox_pub.X[1],
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Xbucket: &self.lox_pub.X[2],
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Xlevel: &self.lox_pub.X[3],
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Xsince: &self.lox_pub.X[4],
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Xblockages: &self.lox_pub.X[6],
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Psince: &(today * P),
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TId: &TId,
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TBucket: &TBucket,
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TBlockages: &TBlockages,
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D: &req.D,
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EncId0: &EncId.0,
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EncId1: &EncId.1,
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EncBucket0: &req.EncBucket.0,
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EncBucket1: &req.EncBucket.1,
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EncBlockages0: &req.EncBlockages.0,
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EncBlockages1: &req.EncBlockages.1,
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x0: &self.lox_priv.x[0],
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x0tilde: &self.lox_priv.x0tilde,
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xid: &self.lox_priv.x[1],
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xbucket: &self.lox_priv.x[2],
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xlevel: &self.lox_priv.x[3],
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xsince: &self.lox_priv.x[4],
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xblockages: &self.lox_priv.x[6],
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s: &s,
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b: &b,
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tid: &tid,
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tbucket: &tbucket,
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tblockages: &tblockages,
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},
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)
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.0;
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Ok(Response {
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P,
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EncQ,
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id_server,
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level_since: today,
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TId,
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TBucket,
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TBlockages,
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piBlindIssue,
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})
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}
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}
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/// Handle the response to the request, producing the new Lox credential
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/// if successful.
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pub fn handle_response(
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state: State,
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resp: Response,
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lox_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
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) -> Result<cred::Lox, ProofError> {
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let A: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_A;
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let B: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_B;
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let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
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if resp.P.is_identity() {
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return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
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}
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// Add the server's contribution to the id to our own, both in plain
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// and encrypted form
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let id = state.id_client + resp.id_server;
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let EncId = (
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state.EncIdClient.0,
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state.EncIdClient.1 + &resp.id_server * Btable,
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);
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// Verify the proof
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let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"redeem invite issuing");
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blindissue::verify_compact(
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&resp.piBlindIssue,
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&mut transcript,
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blindissue::VerifyAssignments {
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A: &A.compress(),
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B: &B.compress(),
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P: &resp.P.compress(),
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EncQ0: &resp.EncQ.0.compress(),
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EncQ1: &resp.EncQ.1.compress(),
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X0: &lox_pub.X[0].compress(),
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Xid: &lox_pub.X[1].compress(),
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Xbucket: &lox_pub.X[2].compress(),
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Xlevel: &lox_pub.X[3].compress(),
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Xsince: &lox_pub.X[4].compress(),
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Xblockages: &lox_pub.X[6].compress(),
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Psince: &(resp.level_since * resp.P).compress(),
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TId: &resp.TId.compress(),
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TBucket: &resp.TBucket.compress(),
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TBlockages: &resp.TBlockages.compress(),
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D: &state.D.compress(),
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EncId0: &EncId.0.compress(),
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EncId1: &EncId.1.compress(),
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EncBucket0: &state.EncBucket.0.compress(),
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EncBucket1: &state.EncBucket.1.compress(),
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EncBlockages0: &state.EncBlockages.0.compress(),
|
||||||
|
EncBlockages1: &state.EncBlockages.1.compress(),
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
)?;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Decrypt EncQ
|
||||||
|
let Q = resp.EncQ.1 - (state.d * resp.EncQ.0);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ok(cred::Lox {
|
||||||
|
P: resp.P,
|
||||||
|
Q,
|
||||||
|
id,
|
||||||
|
bucket: state.bucket,
|
||||||
|
trust_level: Scalar::one(),
|
||||||
|
level_since: resp.level_since,
|
||||||
|
invites_remaining: Scalar::zero(),
|
||||||
|
blockages: state.blockages,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
|
@ -245,7 +245,8 @@ fn test_issue_invite() {
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
fn redeem_invite(ba: &mut BridgeAuth, inv: &cred::Invitation) -> cred::Lox {
|
fn redeem_invite(ba: &mut BridgeAuth, inv: &cred::Invitation) -> cred::Lox {
|
||||||
let (req, state) = redeem_invite::request(&inv, &ba.invitation_pub, ba.today()).unwrap();
|
let (req, state) = redeem_invite::request(&inv, &ba.invitation_pub, ba.today()).unwrap();
|
||||||
panic!("Not finished")
|
let resp = ba.handle_redeem_invite(req).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
redeem_invite::handle_response(state, resp, &ba.lox_pub).unwrap()
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#[test]
|
#[test]
|
||||||
|
@ -266,6 +267,9 @@ fn test_redeem_invite() {
|
||||||
println!("cred3 = {:?}", cred3);
|
println!("cred3 = {:?}", cred3);
|
||||||
println!("invite = {:?}", invite);
|
println!("invite = {:?}", invite);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Time passes
|
||||||
|
ba.advance_days(12);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
let cred4 = redeem_invite(&mut ba, &invite);
|
let cred4 = redeem_invite(&mut ba, &invite);
|
||||||
assert!(ba.verify_lox(&cred4));
|
assert!(ba.verify_lox(&cred4));
|
||||||
println!("cred4 = {:?}", cred4);
|
println!("cred4 = {:?}", cred4);
|
||||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue