The response message of the issue invitation protocol
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@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ use zkp::Transcript;
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use super::super::cred;
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use super::super::cred;
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use super::super::dup_filter::SeenType;
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use super::super::dup_filter::SeenType;
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use super::super::{pt_dbl, scalar_dbl, scalar_u32};
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use super::super::scalar_u32;
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use super::super::{BridgeAuth, IssuerPubKey};
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use super::super::{BridgeAuth, IssuerPubKey};
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use super::super::{CMZ_A, CMZ_A_TABLE, CMZ_B, CMZ_B_TABLE};
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use super::super::{CMZ_A, CMZ_A_TABLE, CMZ_B, CMZ_B_TABLE};
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@ -129,8 +129,15 @@ pub struct Response {
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TSince: RistrettoPoint,
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TSince: RistrettoPoint,
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TInvRemain: RistrettoPoint,
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TInvRemain: RistrettoPoint,
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TBlockages: RistrettoPoint,
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TBlockages: RistrettoPoint,
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// The fields for the new Invitation credential
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P_inv: RistrettoPoint,
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EncQ_inv: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
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inv_id_server: Scalar,
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inv_id_server: Scalar,
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TInvId: RistrettoPoint,
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TId_inv: RistrettoPoint,
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date_inv: Scalar,
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TBucket_inv: RistrettoPoint,
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TBlockages_inv: RistrettoPoint,
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// The ZKP
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// The ZKP
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piBlindIssue: CompactProof,
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piBlindIssue: CompactProof,
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@ -183,6 +190,67 @@ define_proof! {
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EncInvIdClient1 = (inv_id_client*B + einv_id_client*D)
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EncInvIdClient1 = (inv_id_client*B + einv_id_client*D)
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}
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}
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define_proof! {
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blindissue,
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"Issue Invite Issuing",
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(x0, x0tilde, xid, xbucket, xlevel, xsince, xinvremain, xblockages,
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s, b, tid, tbucket, tlevel, tsince, tinvremain, tblockages,
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x0_inv, x0tilde_inv, xid_inv, xdate_inv, xbucket_inv,
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xblockages_inv,
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s_inv, b_inv, tid_inv, tbucket_inv, tblockages_inv),
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(P, EncQ0, EncQ1, X0, Xid, Xbucket, Xlevel, Xsince, Xinvremain,
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Xblockages, TId, TBucket, TLevel, TSince, TInvRemain, TBlockages,
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P_inv, EncQ_inv0, EncQ_inv1, X0_inv, Xid_inv, Xdate_inv,
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Xbucket_inv, Xblockages_inv, Pdate_inv, TId_inv, TBucket_inv,
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TBlockages_inv,
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D, EncId0, EncId1, EncBucket0, EncBucket1, EncLevel0, EncLevel1,
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EncSince0, EncSince1, EncInvRemain0, EncInvRemain1,
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EncBlockages0, EncBlockages1,
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EncInvId0, EncInvId1),
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(A, B):
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Xid = (xid*A),
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Xbucket = (xbucket*A),
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Xlevel = (xlevel*A),
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Xsince = (xsince*A),
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Xinvremain = (xinvremain*A),
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Xblockages = (xblockages*A),
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X0 = (x0*B + x0tilde*A),
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P = (b*B),
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TId = (b*Xid),
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TId = (tid*A),
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TBucket = (b*Xbucket),
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TBucket = (tbucket*A),
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TLevel = (b*Xlevel),
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TLevel = (tlevel*A),
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TSince = (b*Xsince),
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TSince = (tsince*A),
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TInvRemain = (b*Xinvremain),
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TInvRemain = (tinvremain*A),
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TBlockages = (b*Xblockages),
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TBlockages = (tblockages*A),
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EncQ0 = (s*B + tid*EncId0 + tbucket*EncBucket0 + tlevel*EncLevel0
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+ tsince*EncSince0 + tinvremain*EncInvRemain0 + tblockages*EncBlockages0),
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EncQ1 = (s*D + tid*EncId1 + tbucket*EncBucket1 + tlevel*EncLevel1
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+ tsince*EncSince1 + tinvremain*EncInvRemain1 + tblockages*EncBlockages1
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+ x0*P),
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Xid_inv = (xid_inv*A),
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Xdate_inv = (xdate_inv*A),
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Xbucket_inv = (xbucket_inv*A),
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Xblockages_inv = (xblockages_inv*A),
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X0_inv = (x0_inv*B + x0tilde_inv*A),
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P_inv = (b_inv*B),
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TId_inv = (b_inv*Xid_inv),
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TId_inv = (tid_inv*A),
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TBucket_inv = (b_inv*Xbucket_inv),
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TBucket_inv = (tbucket_inv*A),
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TBlockages_inv = (b_inv*Xblockages_inv),
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TBlockages_inv = (tblockages_inv*A),
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EncQ_inv0 = (s_inv*B + tid_inv*EncInvId0 + tbucket_inv*EncBucket0
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+ tblockages_inv*EncBlockages0),
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EncQ_inv1 = (s_inv*D + tid_inv*EncInvId1 + tbucket_inv*EncBucket1
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+ tblockages_inv*EncBlockages1 + x0_inv*P_inv + xdate_inv*Pdate_inv)
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}
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pub fn request(
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pub fn request(
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lox_cred: &cred::Lox,
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lox_cred: &cred::Lox,
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reach_cred: &cred::BucketReachability,
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reach_cred: &cred::BucketReachability,
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@ -231,7 +299,7 @@ pub fn request(
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let zinvremain = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let zinvremain = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let zblockages = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let zblockages = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let CBucket = lox_cred.bucket * P + &zbucket * Atable;
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let CBucket = lox_cred.bucket * P + &zbucket * Atable;
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let CLevel = lox_cred.bucket * P + &zlevel * Atable;
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let CLevel = lox_cred.trust_level * P + &zlevel * Atable;
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let CSince = lox_cred.level_since * P + &zsince * Atable;
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let CSince = lox_cred.level_since * P + &zsince * Atable;
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let CInvRemain = lox_cred.invites_remaining * P + &zinvremain * Atable;
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let CInvRemain = lox_cred.invites_remaining * P + &zinvremain * Atable;
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let CBlockages = lox_cred.blockages * P + &zblockages * Atable;
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let CBlockages = lox_cred.blockages * P + &zblockages * Atable;
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@ -320,7 +388,7 @@ pub fn request(
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let einv_id_client = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let einv_id_client = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let EncInvIdClient = (
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let EncInvIdClient = (
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&einv_id_client * Btable,
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&einv_id_client * Btable,
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&id_client * Btable + einv_id_client * D,
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&inv_id_client * Btable + einv_id_client * D,
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);
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);
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// The proof that invites_remaining is not zero. We prove this by
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// The proof that invites_remaining is not zero. We prove this by
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@ -441,3 +509,285 @@ pub fn request(
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},
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},
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))
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))
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}
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}
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impl BridgeAuth {
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/// Receive an issue invite request
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pub fn handle_issue_invite(&mut self, req: Request) -> Result<Response, ProofError> {
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let A: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_A;
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let B: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_B;
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let Atable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_A_TABLE;
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let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
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if req.P.is_identity() || req.P_reach.is_identity() {
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return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
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}
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let today: Scalar = self.today().into();
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// Recompute the "error factors" using knowledge of our own
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// (the issuer's) private key instead of knowledge of the
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// hidden attributes
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let Vprime = (self.lox_priv.x[0] + self.lox_priv.x[1] * req.id) * req.P
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+ self.lox_priv.x[2] * req.CBucket
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+ self.lox_priv.x[3] * req.CLevel
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+ self.lox_priv.x[4] * req.CSince
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+ self.lox_priv.x[5] * req.CInvRemain
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+ self.lox_priv.x[6] * req.CBlockages
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- req.CQ;
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let Vprime_reach = (self.reachability_priv.x[0] + self.reachability_priv.x[1] * today)
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* req.P_reach
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+ self.reachability_priv.x[2] * req.CBucket_reach
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- req.CQ_reach;
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// Verify the ZKP
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let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"issue invite request");
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requestproof::verify_compact(
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&req.piUser,
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&mut transcript,
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requestproof::VerifyAssignments {
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A: &A.compress(),
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B: &B.compress(),
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P: &req.P.compress(),
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CBucket: &req.CBucket.compress(),
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CLevel: &req.CLevel.compress(),
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CSince: &req.CSince.compress(),
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CInvRemain: &req.CInvRemain.compress(),
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CBlockages: &req.CBlockages.compress(),
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V: &Vprime.compress(),
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Xbucket: &self.lox_pub.X[2].compress(),
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Xlevel: &self.lox_pub.X[3].compress(),
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Xsince: &self.lox_pub.X[4].compress(),
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Xinvremain: &self.lox_pub.X[5].compress(),
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Xblockages: &self.lox_pub.X[6].compress(),
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P_reach: &req.P_reach.compress(),
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CBucket_reach: &req.CBucket_reach.compress(),
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V_reach: &Vprime_reach.compress(),
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Xbucket_reach: &self.reachability_pub.X[2].compress(),
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D: &req.D.compress(),
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EncIdClient0: &req.EncIdClient.0.compress(),
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EncIdClient1: &req.EncIdClient.1.compress(),
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EncBucket0: &req.EncBucket.0.compress(),
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EncBucket1: &req.EncBucket.1.compress(),
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EncLevel0: &req.EncLevel.0.compress(),
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EncLevel1: &req.EncLevel.1.compress(),
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EncSince0: &req.EncSince.0.compress(),
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EncSince1: &req.EncSince.1.compress(),
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EncInvRemain0: &req.EncInvRemain.0.compress(),
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EncInvRemain1_plus_B: &(req.EncInvRemain.1 + B).compress(),
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EncBlockages0: &req.EncBlockages.0.compress(),
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EncBlockages1: &req.EncBlockages.1.compress(),
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EncInvIdClient0: &req.EncInvIdClient.0.compress(),
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EncInvIdClient1: &req.EncInvIdClient.1.compress(),
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},
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)?;
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// Ensure the id has not been seen before, and add it to the
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// seen list.
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if self.id_filter.filter(&req.id) == SeenType::Seen {
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return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
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}
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// Blind issuing of the new Lox credential
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// Choose a random server id component to add to the client's
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// (blinded) id component
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let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
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let id_server = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let EncId = (req.EncIdClient.0, req.EncIdClient.1 + &id_server * Btable);
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// Compute the MAC on the visible attributes (none here)
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let b = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let P = &b * Btable;
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let QHc = self.lox_priv.x[0] * P;
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// El Gamal encrypt it to the public key req.D
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let s = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let EncQHc = (&s * Btable, QHc + s * req.D);
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// Homomorphically compute the part of the MAC corresponding to
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// the blinded attributes
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let tid = self.lox_priv.x[1] * b;
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let TId = &tid * Atable;
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let EncQId = (tid * EncId.0, tid * EncId.1);
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let tbucket = self.lox_priv.x[2] * b;
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let TBucket = &tbucket * Atable;
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let EncQBucket = (tbucket * req.EncBucket.0, tbucket * req.EncBucket.1);
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let tlevel = self.lox_priv.x[3] * b;
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let TLevel = &tlevel * Atable;
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let EncQLevel = (tlevel * req.EncLevel.0, tlevel * req.EncLevel.1);
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let tsince = self.lox_priv.x[4] * b;
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let TSince = &tsince * Atable;
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let EncQSince = (tsince * req.EncSince.0, tsince * req.EncSince.1);
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let tinvremain = self.lox_priv.x[5] * b;
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let TInvRemain = &tinvremain * Atable;
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let EncQInvRemain = (
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tinvremain * req.EncInvRemain.0,
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tinvremain * req.EncInvRemain.1,
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);
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let tblockages = self.lox_priv.x[6] * b;
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let TBlockages = &tblockages * Atable;
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let EncQBlockages = (
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tblockages * req.EncBlockages.0,
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tblockages * req.EncBlockages.1,
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);
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let EncQ = (
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EncQHc.0
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+ EncQId.0
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+ EncQBucket.0
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+ EncQLevel.0
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+ EncQSince.0
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+ EncQInvRemain.0
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+ EncQBlockages.0,
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EncQHc.1
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+ EncQId.1
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+ EncQBucket.1
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+ EncQLevel.1
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+ EncQSince.1
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+ EncQInvRemain.1
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+ EncQBlockages.1,
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);
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// Blind issuing of the new Invitation credential
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// Choose a random server id component to add to the client's
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// (blinded) id component
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let inv_id_server = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let EncInvId = (
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req.EncInvIdClient.0,
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req.EncInvIdClient.1 + &inv_id_server * Btable,
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);
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// Compute the MAC on the visible attributes
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let b_inv = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let P_inv = &b_inv * Btable;
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let QHc_inv = (self.invitation_priv.x[0] + self.invitation_priv.x[2] * today) * P;
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// El Gamal encrypt it to the public key req.D
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let s_inv = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let EncQHc_inv = (&s_inv * Btable, QHc_inv + s_inv * req.D);
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// Homomorphically compute the part of the MAC corresponding to
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// the blinded attributes
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let tinvid = self.invitation_priv.x[1] * b_inv;
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let TId_inv = &tinvid * Atable;
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let EncQInvId = (tinvid * EncInvId.0, tinvid * EncInvId.1);
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let tinvbucket = self.invitation_priv.x[3] * b_inv;
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let TBucket_inv = &tinvbucket * Atable;
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// The bucket and blockages encrypted attributes are reused from
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// the Lox credential
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let EncQInvBucket = (tinvbucket * req.EncBucket.0, tinvbucket * req.EncBucket.1);
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let tinvblockages = self.invitation_priv.x[4] * b_inv;
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let TBlockages_inv = &tinvblockages * Atable;
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let EncQInvBlockages = (
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tinvblockages * req.EncBlockages.0,
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tinvblockages * req.EncBlockages.1,
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);
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let EncQ_inv = (
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EncQHc_inv.0 + EncQInvId.0 + EncQInvBucket.0 + EncQInvBlockages.0,
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EncQHc_inv.1 + EncQInvId.1 + EncQInvBucket.1 + EncQInvBlockages.1,
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);
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let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"issue invite issuing");
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let piBlindIssue = blindissue::prove_compact(
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&mut transcript,
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blindissue::ProveAssignments {
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A: &A,
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B: &B,
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P: &P,
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EncQ0: &EncQ.0,
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EncQ1: &EncQ.1,
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X0: &self.lox_pub.X[0],
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Xid: &self.lox_pub.X[1],
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Xbucket: &self.lox_pub.X[2],
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Xlevel: &self.lox_pub.X[3],
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Xsince: &self.lox_pub.X[4],
|
||||||
|
Xinvremain: &self.lox_pub.X[5],
|
||||||
|
Xblockages: &self.lox_pub.X[6],
|
||||||
|
TId: &TId,
|
||||||
|
TBucket: &TBucket,
|
||||||
|
TLevel: &TLevel,
|
||||||
|
TSince: &TSince,
|
||||||
|
TInvRemain: &TInvRemain,
|
||||||
|
TBlockages: &TBlockages,
|
||||||
|
P_inv: &P_inv,
|
||||||
|
EncQ_inv0: &EncQ_inv.0,
|
||||||
|
EncQ_inv1: &EncQ_inv.1,
|
||||||
|
X0_inv: &self.invitation_pub.X[0],
|
||||||
|
Xid_inv: &self.invitation_pub.X[1],
|
||||||
|
Xdate_inv: &self.invitation_pub.X[2],
|
||||||
|
Xbucket_inv: &self.invitation_pub.X[3],
|
||||||
|
Xblockages_inv: &self.invitation_pub.X[4],
|
||||||
|
Pdate_inv: &(today * P_inv),
|
||||||
|
TId_inv: &TId_inv,
|
||||||
|
TBucket_inv: &TBucket_inv,
|
||||||
|
TBlockages_inv: &TBlockages_inv,
|
||||||
|
D: &req.D,
|
||||||
|
EncId0: &EncId.0,
|
||||||
|
EncId1: &EncId.1,
|
||||||
|
EncBucket0: &req.EncBucket.0,
|
||||||
|
EncBucket1: &req.EncBucket.1,
|
||||||
|
EncLevel0: &req.EncLevel.0,
|
||||||
|
EncLevel1: &req.EncLevel.1,
|
||||||
|
EncSince0: &req.EncSince.0,
|
||||||
|
EncSince1: &req.EncSince.1,
|
||||||
|
EncInvRemain0: &req.EncInvRemain.0,
|
||||||
|
EncInvRemain1: &req.EncInvRemain.1,
|
||||||
|
EncBlockages0: &req.EncBlockages.0,
|
||||||
|
EncBlockages1: &req.EncBlockages.1,
|
||||||
|
EncInvId0: &EncInvId.0,
|
||||||
|
EncInvId1: &EncInvId.1,
|
||||||
|
x0: &self.lox_priv.x[0],
|
||||||
|
x0tilde: &self.lox_priv.x0tilde,
|
||||||
|
xid: &self.lox_priv.x[1],
|
||||||
|
xbucket: &self.lox_priv.x[2],
|
||||||
|
xlevel: &self.lox_priv.x[3],
|
||||||
|
xsince: &self.lox_priv.x[4],
|
||||||
|
xinvremain: &self.lox_priv.x[5],
|
||||||
|
xblockages: &self.lox_priv.x[6],
|
||||||
|
s: &s,
|
||||||
|
b: &b,
|
||||||
|
tid: &tid,
|
||||||
|
tbucket: &tbucket,
|
||||||
|
tlevel: &tlevel,
|
||||||
|
tsince: &tsince,
|
||||||
|
tinvremain: &tinvremain,
|
||||||
|
tblockages: &tblockages,
|
||||||
|
x0_inv: &self.invitation_priv.x[0],
|
||||||
|
x0tilde_inv: &self.invitation_priv.x0tilde,
|
||||||
|
xid_inv: &self.invitation_priv.x[1],
|
||||||
|
xdate_inv: &self.invitation_priv.x[2],
|
||||||
|
xbucket_inv: &self.invitation_priv.x[3],
|
||||||
|
xblockages_inv: &self.invitation_priv.x[4],
|
||||||
|
s_inv: &s_inv,
|
||||||
|
b_inv: &b_inv,
|
||||||
|
tid_inv: &tinvid,
|
||||||
|
tbucket_inv: &tinvbucket,
|
||||||
|
tblockages_inv: &tinvblockages,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
.0;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ok(Response {
|
||||||
|
P,
|
||||||
|
EncQ,
|
||||||
|
id_server,
|
||||||
|
TId,
|
||||||
|
TBucket,
|
||||||
|
TLevel,
|
||||||
|
TSince,
|
||||||
|
TInvRemain,
|
||||||
|
TBlockages,
|
||||||
|
P_inv,
|
||||||
|
EncQ_inv,
|
||||||
|
inv_id_server,
|
||||||
|
TId_inv,
|
||||||
|
date_inv: today,
|
||||||
|
TBucket_inv,
|
||||||
|
TBlockages_inv,
|
||||||
|
piBlindIssue,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
|
@ -243,9 +243,8 @@ define_proof! {
|
||||||
D, EncId0, EncId1, EncBucket0, EncBucket1, EncBlockages0, EncBlockages1),
|
D, EncId0, EncId1, EncBucket0, EncBucket1, EncBlockages0, EncBlockages1),
|
||||||
(A, B):
|
(A, B):
|
||||||
Xid = (xid*A),
|
Xid = (xid*A),
|
||||||
Xid = (xid*A),
|
|
||||||
Xlevel = (xlevel*A),
|
|
||||||
Xbucket = (xbucket*A),
|
Xbucket = (xbucket*A),
|
||||||
|
Xlevel = (xlevel*A),
|
||||||
Xsince = (xsince*A),
|
Xsince = (xsince*A),
|
||||||
Xinvremain = (xinvremain*A),
|
Xinvremain = (xinvremain*A),
|
||||||
Xblockages = (xblockages*A),
|
Xblockages = (xblockages*A),
|
||||||
|
@ -700,7 +699,7 @@ impl BridgeAuth {
|
||||||
let Atable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_A_TABLE;
|
let Atable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_A_TABLE;
|
||||||
let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
|
let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if req.P.is_identity() {
|
if req.P.is_identity() || req.P_reach.is_identity() {
|
||||||
return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
|
return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
|
@ -231,4 +231,5 @@ fn test_issue_inv() {
|
||||||
ba.today(),
|
ba.today(),
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
.unwrap();
|
.unwrap();
|
||||||
|
let resp = ba.handle_issue_invite(req).unwrap();
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue