Complete the issue invitation protocol
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@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ edition = "2018"
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[dependencies]
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curve25519-dalek = { package = "curve25519-dalek-ng", version = "3", default-features = false, features = ["serde", "std"] }
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ed25519-dalek = "1"
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# zkp = { version = "0.8", features = ["debug-transcript"] }
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zkp = "0.8"
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zkp = { version = "0.8", features = ["debug-transcript"] }
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# zkp = "0.8"
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bincode = "1"
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rand = "0.7"
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serde = "1"
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@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ pub fn request(
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return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
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}
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// The new invites_remaining
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let new_invites_remaining = &lox_cred.invites_remaining - Scalar::one();
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let new_invites_remaining = lox_cred.invites_remaining - Scalar::one();
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// Blind showing the Lox credential
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@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ impl BridgeAuth {
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// Compute the MAC on the visible attributes
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let b_inv = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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let P_inv = &b_inv * Btable;
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let QHc_inv = (self.invitation_priv.x[0] + self.invitation_priv.x[2] * today) * P;
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let QHc_inv = (self.invitation_priv.x[0] + self.invitation_priv.x[2] * today) * P_inv;
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// El Gamal encrypt it to the public key req.D
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let s_inv = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
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@ -791,3 +791,114 @@ impl BridgeAuth {
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})
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}
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}
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/// Handle the response to the request, producing the new Lox credential
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/// and Invitation credential if successful.
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pub fn handle_response(
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state: State,
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resp: Response,
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lox_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
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invitation_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
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) -> Result<(cred::Lox, cred::Invitation), ProofError> {
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let A: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_A;
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let B: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_B;
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let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
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if resp.P.is_identity() || resp.P_inv.is_identity() {
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return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
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}
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// Add the server's contribution to the id to our own, both in plain
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// and encrypted form and for both the Lox credential id and the
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// Invitation credential id
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let id = state.id_client + resp.id_server;
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let EncId = (
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state.EncIdClient.0,
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state.EncIdClient.1 + &resp.id_server * Btable,
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);
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let inv_id = state.inv_id_client + resp.inv_id_server;
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let EncInvId = (
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state.EncInvIdClient.0,
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state.EncInvIdClient.1 + &resp.inv_id_server * Btable,
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);
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// Verify the proof
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let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"issue invite issuing");
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blindissue::verify_compact(
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&resp.piBlindIssue,
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&mut transcript,
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blindissue::VerifyAssignments {
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A: &A.compress(),
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B: &B.compress(),
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P: &resp.P.compress(),
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EncQ0: &resp.EncQ.0.compress(),
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EncQ1: &resp.EncQ.1.compress(),
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X0: &lox_pub.X[0].compress(),
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Xid: &lox_pub.X[1].compress(),
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Xbucket: &lox_pub.X[2].compress(),
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Xlevel: &lox_pub.X[3].compress(),
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Xsince: &lox_pub.X[4].compress(),
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Xinvremain: &lox_pub.X[5].compress(),
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Xblockages: &lox_pub.X[6].compress(),
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TId: &resp.TId.compress(),
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TBucket: &resp.TBucket.compress(),
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TLevel: &resp.TLevel.compress(),
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TSince: &resp.TSince.compress(),
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TInvRemain: &resp.TInvRemain.compress(),
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TBlockages: &resp.TBlockages.compress(),
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P_inv: &resp.P_inv.compress(),
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EncQ_inv0: &resp.EncQ_inv.0.compress(),
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EncQ_inv1: &resp.EncQ_inv.1.compress(),
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X0_inv: &invitation_pub.X[0].compress(),
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Xid_inv: &invitation_pub.X[1].compress(),
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Xdate_inv: &invitation_pub.X[2].compress(),
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Xbucket_inv: &invitation_pub.X[3].compress(),
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Xblockages_inv: &invitation_pub.X[4].compress(),
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Pdate_inv: &(resp.date_inv * resp.P_inv).compress(),
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TId_inv: &resp.TId_inv.compress(),
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TBucket_inv: &resp.TBucket_inv.compress(),
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TBlockages_inv: &resp.TBlockages_inv.compress(),
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D: &state.D.compress(),
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EncId0: &EncId.0.compress(),
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EncId1: &EncId.1.compress(),
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EncBucket0: &state.EncBucket.0.compress(),
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EncBucket1: &state.EncBucket.1.compress(),
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EncLevel0: &state.EncLevel.0.compress(),
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EncLevel1: &state.EncLevel.1.compress(),
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EncSince0: &state.EncSince.0.compress(),
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EncSince1: &state.EncSince.1.compress(),
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EncInvRemain0: &state.EncInvRemain.0.compress(),
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EncInvRemain1: &state.EncInvRemain.1.compress(),
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EncBlockages0: &state.EncBlockages.0.compress(),
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EncBlockages1: &state.EncBlockages.1.compress(),
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EncInvId0: &EncInvId.0.compress(),
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EncInvId1: &EncInvId.1.compress(),
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},
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)?;
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// Decrypt EncQ and EncQ_inv
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let Q = resp.EncQ.1 - (state.d * resp.EncQ.0);
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let Q_inv = resp.EncQ_inv.1 - (state.d * resp.EncQ_inv.0);
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Ok((
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cred::Lox {
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P: resp.P,
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Q,
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id,
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bucket: state.bucket,
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trust_level: state.level,
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level_since: state.since,
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invites_remaining: state.invremain,
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blockages: state.blockages,
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},
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cred::Invitation {
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P: resp.P_inv,
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Q: Q_inv,
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inv_id,
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date: resp.date_inv,
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bucket: state.bucket,
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blockages: state.blockages,
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},
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))
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}
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@ -232,4 +232,10 @@ fn test_issue_inv() {
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)
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.unwrap();
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let resp = ba.handle_issue_invite(req).unwrap();
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let (cred3, invite) =
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issue_invite::handle_response(state, resp, &ba.lox_pub, &ba.invitation_pub).unwrap();
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assert!(ba.verify_lox(&cred3));
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assert!(ba.verify_invitation(&invite));
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println!("cred3 = {:?}", cred3);
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println!("invite = {:?}", invite);
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}
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