The complete migration protocol for the case of migrating from trust level 0 to trust level 1

This commit is contained in:
Ian Goldberg 2021-04-30 16:24:42 -04:00
parent 6013386f07
commit 83b12ff6f6
3 changed files with 667 additions and 6 deletions

View File

@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ pub mod bridge_table;
pub mod cred;
pub mod dup_filter;
pub mod migration_table;
pub mod trust_promotion;
use sha2::Sha512;
@ -33,6 +32,8 @@ use curve25519_dalek::constants as dalek_constants;
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoBasepointTable;
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
#[cfg(test)]
use curve25519_dalek::traits::IsIdentity;
use ed25519_dalek::{Keypair, PublicKey, Signature, SignatureError, Signer, Verifier};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
@ -257,8 +258,12 @@ impl BridgeAuth {
}
#[cfg(test)]
/// Verify the MAC on a Lox credential
/// Verify the two MACs on a Lox credential
pub fn verify_lox(&self, cred: &cred::Lox) -> bool {
if cred.P.is_identity() || cred.P_noopmigration.is_identity() {
return false;
}
let Q = (self.lox_priv.x[0]
+ cred.id * self.lox_priv.x[1]
+ cred.bucket * self.lox_priv.x[2]
@ -267,12 +272,23 @@ impl BridgeAuth {
+ cred.invites_remaining * self.lox_priv.x[5]
+ cred.invites_issued * self.lox_priv.x[6])
* cred.P;
return Q == cred.Q;
let Q_noopmigration = (self.migration_priv.x[0]
+ cred.id * self.migration_priv.x[1]
+ cred.bucket * self.migration_priv.x[2]
+ cred.bucket * self.migration_priv.x[3])
* cred.P_noopmigration;
return Q == cred.Q && Q_noopmigration == cred.Q_noopmigration;
}
#[cfg(test)]
/// Verify the MAC on a Migration credential
pub fn verify_migration(&self, cred: &cred::Migration) -> bool {
if cred.P.is_identity() {
return false;
}
let Q = (self.migration_priv.x[0]
+ cred.lox_id * self.migration_priv.x[1]
+ cred.from_bucket * self.migration_priv.x[2]
@ -303,7 +319,9 @@ pub fn pt_dbl(P: &RistrettoPoint) -> RistrettoPoint {
}
// The protocol modules
pub mod migration;
pub mod open_invite;
pub mod trust_promotion;
// Unit tests
#[cfg(test)]

View File

@ -0,0 +1,612 @@
/*! A module for the protocol for the user to migrate from one bucket to
another (and possibly also change trust level).
For the case of migrating from trust level 0 (a one-bridge bucket) to
trust level 1 (a three-bridge bucket), the user presents their current
Lox credential:
- id: revealed
- bucket: blinded
- trust_level: revealed to be 0
- level_since: blinded
- invites_remaining: revealed to be 0
- invites_issued: revealed to be 0
and a Migration credential:
- id: revealed as the same as the Lox credential id above
- from_bucket: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's the same as the
bucket in the Lox credential above
- to_bucket: blinded
and a new Lox credential to be issued:
- id: jointly chosen by the user and BA
- bucket: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's the same as the to_bucket
in the Migration credential above
- trust_level: 1
- level_since: today
- invites_remaining: 0
- invites_issued: 0
*/
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoBasepointTable;
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
use curve25519_dalek::traits::IsIdentity;
use zkp::CompactProof;
use zkp::ProofError;
use zkp::Transcript;
use super::cred;
use super::{BridgeAuth, IssuerPubKey};
use super::{CMZ_A, CMZ_A_TABLE, CMZ_B, CMZ_B_TABLE};
pub struct Request {
// Fields for blind showing the Lox credential
// We don't need to include invites_remaining or invites_issued,
// since they must be 0
P_lox: RistrettoPoint,
id: Scalar,
CBucket: RistrettoPoint,
trust_level: Scalar,
CSince: RistrettoPoint,
CQ_lox: RistrettoPoint,
// Fields for blind showing the Migration credential
P_mig: RistrettoPoint,
CFromBucket: RistrettoPoint,
CToBucket: RistrettoPoint,
CQ_mig: RistrettoPoint,
// Fields for user blinding of the Lox credential to be issued
D: RistrettoPoint,
EncIdClient: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
EncBucket: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
// The combined ZKP
piUser: CompactProof,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct State {
d: Scalar,
D: RistrettoPoint,
EncIdClient: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
EncBucket: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
id_client: Scalar,
to_bucket: Scalar,
}
pub struct Response {
// The new attributes; trust_level = 1 is implicit
level_since: Scalar,
// The fields for the new Lox credential
P: RistrettoPoint,
EncQ: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
id_server: Scalar,
TId: RistrettoPoint,
TBucket: RistrettoPoint,
// The fields for the implicit noop migration ("nm") credential
P_nm: RistrettoPoint,
EncQ_nm: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
TId_nm: RistrettoPoint,
TBucket_nm: RistrettoPoint,
// The ZKP
piBlindIssue: CompactProof,
}
define_proof! {
requestproof,
"Migration Request",
(bucket, since, zbucket, zsince, negzQ_lox,
tobucket, zfrombucket, ztobucket, negzQ_mig,
d, eid_client, ebucket, id_client),
(P_lox, CBucket, CSince, V_lox, Xbucket, Xsince,
P_mig, CFromBucket, CToBucket, V_mig, Xfrombucket, Xtobucket,
D, EncIdClient0, EncIdClient1, EncBucket0, EncBucket1),
(A, B):
// Blind showing of the Lox credential
CBucket = (bucket*P_lox + zbucket*A),
CSince = (since*P_lox + zsince*A),
V_lox = (zbucket*Xbucket + zsince*Xsince + negzQ_lox*A),
// Blind showing of the Migration credential; note the use of the
// same "bucket" secret variable
CFromBucket = (bucket*P_mig + zfrombucket*A),
CToBucket = (tobucket*P_mig + ztobucket*A),
V_mig = (zfrombucket*Xfrombucket + ztobucket*Xtobucket + negzQ_mig*A),
// User blinding of the Lox credential to be issued; note the use of
// the same "tobucket" secret variable
EncIdClient0 = (eid_client*B),
EncIdClient1 = (id_client*B + eid_client*D),
EncBucket0 = (ebucket*B),
EncBucket1 = (tobucket*B + ebucket*D),
D = (d*B)
}
define_proof! {
blindissue,
"Migration Blind Issuing",
(x0, x0tilde, xid, xbucket, xlevel, xsince, s, b, tid, tbucket,
x0_nm, x0tilde_nm, xid_nm, xfrom_nm, xto_nm, s_nm, b_nm, tid_nm, tbucket_nm),
(P, EncQ0, EncQ1, X0, Xid, Xbucket, Xlevel, Xsince, Plevel, Psince, TId, TBucket,
P_nm, EncQ0_nm, EncQ1_nm, X0_nm, Xid_nm, Xfrom_nm, Xto_nm,
TId_nm, TBucket_nm,
D, EncId0, EncId1, EncBucket0, EncBucket1),
(A, B):
Xid = (xid*A),
Xlevel = (xlevel*A),
Xbucket = (xbucket*A),
Xsince = (xsince*A),
X0 = (x0*B + x0tilde*A),
P = (b*B),
TId = (b*Xid),
TId = (tid*A),
TBucket = (b*Xbucket),
TBucket = (tbucket*A),
EncQ0 = (s*B + tid*EncId0 + tbucket*EncBucket0),
EncQ1 = (s*D + tid*EncId1 + tbucket*EncBucket1 + x0*P + xlevel*Plevel + xsince*Psince),
Xid_nm = (xid_nm*A),
Xfrom_nm = (xfrom_nm*A),
Xto_nm = (xto_nm*A),
X0_nm = (x0_nm*B + x0tilde_nm*A),
P_nm = (b_nm*B),
TId_nm = (b_nm*Xid_nm),
TId_nm = (tid_nm*A),
TBucket_nm = (b_nm*Xfrom_nm + b_nm*Xto_nm),
TBucket_nm = (tbucket_nm*A),
EncQ0_nm = (s_nm*B + tid_nm*EncId0 + tbucket_nm*EncBucket0),
EncQ1_nm = (s_nm*D + tid_nm*EncId1 + tbucket_nm*EncBucket1 + x0_nm*P_nm)
}
pub fn request(
lox_cred: &cred::Lox,
migration_cred: &cred::Migration,
lox_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
migration_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
) -> Result<(Request, State), ProofError> {
let A: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_A;
let B: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_B;
let Atable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_A_TABLE;
let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
// Ensure that the credenials can be correctly shown; that is, the
// ids match and the Lox credential bucket matches the Migration
// credential from_bucket
if lox_cred.id != migration_cred.lox_id || lox_cred.bucket != migration_cred.from_bucket {
return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
}
// We only support migrating from trust level 0 to trust level 1
// right now
if lox_cred.trust_level != Scalar::zero() {
return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
}
// Blind showing the Lox credential
// Reblind P and Q
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let t_lox = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let P_lox = t_lox * lox_cred.P;
let Q_lox = t_lox * lox_cred.Q;
// Form Pedersen commitments to the blinded attributes
let zbucket = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let zsince = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let CBucket = lox_cred.bucket * P_lox + &zbucket * Atable;
let CSince = lox_cred.level_since * P_lox + &zsince * Atable;
// Form a Pedersen commitment to the MAC Q
// We flip the sign of zQ from that of the Hyphae paper so that
// the ZKP has a "+" instead of a "-", as that's what the zkp
// macro supports.
let negzQ_lox = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let CQ_lox = Q_lox - &negzQ_lox * Atable;
// Compute the "error factor"
let V_lox = zbucket * lox_pub.X[2] + zsince * lox_pub.X[4] + &negzQ_lox * Atable;
// Blind showing the Migration credential
// Reblind P and Q
let t_mig = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let P_mig = t_mig * migration_cred.P;
let Q_mig = t_mig * migration_cred.Q;
// Form Pedersen commitments to the blinded attributes
let zfrombucket = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let ztobucket = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let CFromBucket = migration_cred.from_bucket * P_mig + &zfrombucket * Atable;
let CToBucket = migration_cred.to_bucket * P_mig + &ztobucket * Atable;
// Form a Pedersen commitment to the MAC Q
// We flip the sign of zQ from that of the Hyphae paper so that
// the ZKP has a "+" instead of a "-", as that's what the zkp
// macro supports.
let negzQ_mig = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let CQ_mig = Q_mig - &negzQ_mig * Atable;
// Compute the "error factor"
let V_mig =
zfrombucket * migration_pub.X[2] + ztobucket * migration_pub.X[3] + &negzQ_mig * Atable;
// User blinding for the Lox certificate to be issued
// Pick an ElGamal keypair
let d = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let D = &d * Btable;
// Pick a random client component of the id
let id_client = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
// Encrypt it (times the basepoint B) to the ElGamal public key D we
// just created
let eid_client = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let EncIdClient = (&eid_client * Btable, &id_client * Btable + eid_client * D);
// Encrypt the bucket field (times B) to D as well
let ebucket = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let EncBucket = (
&ebucket * Btable,
&migration_cred.to_bucket * Btable + ebucket * D,
);
// Construct the proof
let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"migration request");
let piUser = requestproof::prove_compact(
&mut transcript,
requestproof::ProveAssignments {
A: &A,
B: &B,
P_lox: &P_lox,
CBucket: &CBucket,
CSince: &CSince,
V_lox: &V_lox,
Xbucket: &lox_pub.X[2],
Xsince: &lox_pub.X[4],
P_mig: &P_mig,
CFromBucket: &CFromBucket,
CToBucket: &CToBucket,
V_mig: &V_mig,
Xfrombucket: &migration_pub.X[2],
Xtobucket: &migration_pub.X[3],
D: &D,
EncIdClient0: &EncIdClient.0,
EncIdClient1: &EncIdClient.1,
EncBucket0: &EncBucket.0,
EncBucket1: &EncBucket.1,
bucket: &lox_cred.bucket,
since: &lox_cred.level_since,
zbucket: &zbucket,
zsince: &zsince,
negzQ_lox: &negzQ_lox,
tobucket: &migration_cred.to_bucket,
zfrombucket: &zfrombucket,
ztobucket: &ztobucket,
negzQ_mig: &negzQ_mig,
d: &d,
eid_client: &eid_client,
ebucket: &ebucket,
id_client: &id_client,
},
)
.0;
Ok((
Request {
P_lox,
id: lox_cred.id,
CBucket,
trust_level: lox_cred.trust_level,
CSince,
CQ_lox,
P_mig,
CFromBucket,
CToBucket,
CQ_mig,
D,
EncIdClient,
EncBucket,
piUser,
},
State {
d,
D,
EncIdClient,
EncBucket,
id_client,
to_bucket: migration_cred.to_bucket,
},
))
}
impl BridgeAuth {
/// Receive a migration request
pub fn handle_migration(&mut self, req: Request) -> Result<Response, ProofError> {
let A: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_A;
let B: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_B;
let Atable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_A_TABLE;
let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
if req.P_lox.is_identity() || req.P_mig.is_identity() {
return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
}
// We only currently support migrating from trust level 0
if req.trust_level != Scalar::zero() {
return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
}
// Recompute the "error factors" using knowledge of our own
// (the issuer's) private key instead of knowledge of the
// hidden attributes
let Vprime_lox = (self.lox_priv.x[0]
+ self.lox_priv.x[1] * req.id
+ self.lox_priv.x[3] * req.trust_level)
* req.P_lox
+ self.lox_priv.x[2] * req.CBucket
+ self.lox_priv.x[4] * req.CSince
- req.CQ_lox;
let Vprime_mig = (self.migration_priv.x[0] + self.migration_priv.x[1] * req.id) * req.P_mig
+ self.migration_priv.x[2] * req.CFromBucket
+ self.migration_priv.x[3] * req.CToBucket
- req.CQ_mig;
// Verify the ZKP
let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"migration request");
requestproof::verify_compact(
&req.piUser,
&mut transcript,
requestproof::VerifyAssignments {
A: &A.compress(),
B: &B.compress(),
P_lox: &req.P_lox.compress(),
CBucket: &req.CBucket.compress(),
CSince: &req.CSince.compress(),
V_lox: &Vprime_lox.compress(),
Xbucket: &self.lox_pub.X[2].compress(),
Xsince: &self.lox_pub.X[4].compress(),
P_mig: &req.P_mig.compress(),
CFromBucket: &req.CFromBucket.compress(),
CToBucket: &req.CToBucket.compress(),
V_mig: &Vprime_mig.compress(),
Xfrombucket: &self.migration_pub.X[2].compress(),
Xtobucket: &self.migration_pub.X[3].compress(),
D: &req.D.compress(),
EncIdClient0: &req.EncIdClient.0.compress(),
EncIdClient1: &req.EncIdClient.1.compress(),
EncBucket0: &req.EncBucket.0.compress(),
EncBucket1: &req.EncBucket.1.compress(),
},
)?;
// Blind issuing of the new Lox credential
// Choose a random server id component to add to the client's
// (blinded) id component
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let id_server = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let EncId = (req.EncIdClient.0, req.EncIdClient.1 + &id_server * Btable);
// Create the trust_level attrubute (Scalar), which will be
// level 1
let trust_level: Scalar = Scalar::one();
// Create the level_since attribute (Scalar), which is today's
// Julian date
let level_since: Scalar = self.today().into();
// The invitations_remaining and invitations_issued attributes
// are 0 for level 0 and level 1 Lox credentials, so we don't
// need to explicitly create them.
// Compute the MAC on the visible attributes
let b = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let P = &b * Btable;
// invites_remaining = invites_issued = 0
let QHc = (self.lox_priv.x[0]
+ self.lox_priv.x[3] * trust_level
+ self.lox_priv.x[4] * level_since)
* P;
// El Gamal encrypt it to the public key req.D
let s = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let EncQHc = (&s * Btable, QHc + s * req.D);
// Homomorphically compute the part of the MAC corresponding to
// the blinded id attribute
let tid = self.lox_priv.x[1] * b;
let TId = &tid * Atable;
let EncQId = (tid * EncId.0, tid * EncId.1);
let tbucket = self.lox_priv.x[2] * b;
let TBucket = &tbucket * Atable;
let EncQBucket = (tbucket * req.EncBucket.0, tbucket * req.EncBucket.1);
let EncQ = (
EncQHc.0 + EncQId.0 + EncQBucket.0,
EncQHc.1 + EncQId.1 + EncQBucket.1,
);
// Now the no-op migration credential
// Compute the MAC on the visible attributes (none here)
let b_nm = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let P_nm = &b_nm * Btable;
let QHc_nm = (self.migration_priv.x[0]) * P_nm;
// El Gamal encrypt it to the public key req.D
let s_nm = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let EncQHc_nm = (&s_nm * Btable, QHc_nm + s_nm * req.D);
// Homomorphically compute the part of the MAC corresponding to
// the blinded attributes
let tid_nm = self.migration_priv.x[1] * b_nm;
let TId_nm = &tid_nm * Atable;
let EncQId_nm = (tid_nm * EncId.0, tid_nm * EncId.1);
let tbucket_nm = (self.migration_priv.x[2] + self.migration_priv.x[3]) * b_nm;
let TBucket_nm = &tbucket_nm * Atable;
let EncQBucket_nm = (tbucket_nm * req.EncBucket.0, tbucket_nm * req.EncBucket.1);
let EncQ_nm = (
EncQHc_nm.0 + EncQId_nm.0 + EncQBucket_nm.0,
EncQHc_nm.1 + EncQId_nm.1 + EncQBucket_nm.1,
);
let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"migration issuing");
let piBlindIssue = blindissue::prove_compact(
&mut transcript,
blindissue::ProveAssignments {
A: &A,
B: &B,
P: &P,
EncQ0: &EncQ.0,
EncQ1: &EncQ.1,
X0: &self.lox_pub.X[0],
Xid: &self.lox_pub.X[1],
Xbucket: &self.lox_pub.X[2],
Xlevel: &self.lox_pub.X[3],
Xsince: &self.lox_pub.X[4],
Plevel: &(trust_level * P),
Psince: &(level_since * P),
TId: &TId,
TBucket: &TBucket,
P_nm: &P_nm,
EncQ0_nm: &EncQ_nm.0,
EncQ1_nm: &EncQ_nm.1,
X0_nm: &self.migration_pub.X[0],
Xid_nm: &self.migration_pub.X[1],
Xfrom_nm: &self.migration_pub.X[2],
Xto_nm: &self.migration_pub.X[3],
TId_nm: &TId_nm,
TBucket_nm: &TBucket_nm,
D: &req.D,
EncId0: &EncId.0,
EncId1: &EncId.1,
EncBucket0: &req.EncBucket.0,
EncBucket1: &req.EncBucket.1,
x0: &self.lox_priv.x[0],
x0tilde: &self.lox_priv.x0tilde,
xid: &self.lox_priv.x[1],
xbucket: &self.lox_priv.x[2],
xlevel: &self.lox_priv.x[3],
xsince: &self.lox_priv.x[4],
s: &s,
b: &b,
tid: &tid,
tbucket: &tbucket,
x0_nm: &self.migration_priv.x[0],
x0tilde_nm: &self.migration_priv.x0tilde,
xid_nm: &self.migration_priv.x[1],
xfrom_nm: &self.migration_priv.x[2],
xto_nm: &self.migration_priv.x[3],
s_nm: &s_nm,
b_nm: &b_nm,
tid_nm: &tid_nm,
tbucket_nm: &tbucket_nm,
},
)
.0;
Ok(Response {
level_since,
P,
EncQ,
id_server,
TId,
TBucket,
P_nm,
EncQ_nm,
TId_nm,
TBucket_nm,
piBlindIssue,
})
}
}
/// Handle the response to the request, producing the new Lox credential
/// if successful.
pub fn handle_response(
state: State,
resp: Response,
lox_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
migration_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
) -> Result<cred::Lox, ProofError> {
let A: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_A;
let B: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_B;
let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
if resp.P.is_identity() || resp.P_nm.is_identity() {
return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
}
// Add the server's contribution to the id to our own, both in plain
// and encrypted form
let id = state.id_client + resp.id_server;
let EncId = (
state.EncIdClient.0,
state.EncIdClient.1 + &resp.id_server * Btable,
);
// Verify the proof
let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"migration issuing");
blindissue::verify_compact(
&resp.piBlindIssue,
&mut transcript,
blindissue::VerifyAssignments {
A: &A.compress(),
B: &B.compress(),
P: &resp.P.compress(),
EncQ0: &resp.EncQ.0.compress(),
EncQ1: &resp.EncQ.1.compress(),
X0: &lox_pub.X[0].compress(),
Xid: &lox_pub.X[1].compress(),
Xbucket: &lox_pub.X[2].compress(),
Xlevel: &lox_pub.X[3].compress(),
Xsince: &lox_pub.X[4].compress(),
// The new trust level is 1
Plevel: &(Scalar::one() * resp.P).compress(),
Psince: &(resp.level_since * resp.P).compress(),
TId: &resp.TId.compress(),
TBucket: &resp.TBucket.compress(),
P_nm: &resp.P_nm.compress(),
EncQ0_nm: &resp.EncQ_nm.0.compress(),
EncQ1_nm: &resp.EncQ_nm.1.compress(),
X0_nm: &migration_pub.X[0].compress(),
Xid_nm: &migration_pub.X[1].compress(),
Xfrom_nm: &migration_pub.X[2].compress(),
Xto_nm: &migration_pub.X[3].compress(),
TId_nm: &resp.TId_nm.compress(),
TBucket_nm: &resp.TBucket_nm.compress(),
D: &state.D.compress(),
EncId0: &EncId.0.compress(),
EncId1: &EncId.1.compress(),
EncBucket0: &state.EncBucket.0.compress(),
EncBucket1: &state.EncBucket.1.compress(),
},
)?;
// Decrypt EncQ
let Q = resp.EncQ.1 - (state.d * resp.EncQ.0);
// Decrypt EncQ_nm
let Q_nm = resp.EncQ_nm.1 - (state.d * resp.EncQ_nm.0);
Ok(cred::Lox {
P: resp.P,
Q,
id,
bucket: state.to_bucket,
trust_level: Scalar::one(),
level_since: resp.level_since,
invites_remaining: Scalar::zero(),
invites_issued: Scalar::zero(),
P_noopmigration: resp.P_nm,
Q_noopmigration: Q_nm,
})
}

View File

@ -45,8 +45,7 @@ fn test_open_invite() {
assert!(ba.verify_lox(&cred));
}
#[test]
fn test_trust_promotion() {
fn setup() -> (BridgeDb, BridgeAuth) {
// Create a BridegDb
let bdb = BridgeDb::new(15);
// Create a BridgeAuth
@ -76,6 +75,10 @@ fn test_trust_promotion() {
// Create the encrypted bridge table
ba.bridge_table.encrypt_table();
(bdb, ba)
}
fn trust_promotion(bdb: &BridgeDb, ba: &mut BridgeAuth) -> (cred::Lox, cred::Migration) {
// Issue an open invitation
let inv = bdb.invite();
@ -91,7 +94,16 @@ fn test_trust_promotion() {
let (promreq, promstate) = trust_promotion::request(&cred, &ba.lox_pub, ba.today()).unwrap();
let promresp = ba.handle_trust_promotion(promreq).unwrap();
let migcred = trust_promotion::handle_response(promstate, promresp).unwrap();
println!("resp = {:?}", migcred);
(cred, migcred)
}
#[test]
fn test_trust_promotion() {
let (bdb, mut ba) = setup();
let (_loxcred, migcred) = trust_promotion(&bdb, &mut ba);
assert!(ba.verify_migration(&migcred));
// Check that we can use the to_bucket in the Migration credenital
// to read a bucket
@ -99,3 +111,22 @@ fn test_trust_promotion() {
let bucket = ba.bridge_table.decrypt_bucket_id(id, &key).unwrap();
println!("bucket = {:?}", bucket);
}
#[test]
fn test_level0_migration() {
let (bdb, mut ba) = setup();
let (loxcred, migcred) = trust_promotion(&bdb, &mut ba);
let (migreq, migstate) =
migration::request(&loxcred, &migcred, &ba.lox_pub, &ba.migration_pub).unwrap();
let migresp = ba.handle_migration(migreq).unwrap();
let newloxcred =
migration::handle_response(migstate, migresp, &ba.lox_pub, &ba.migration_pub).unwrap();
assert!(ba.verify_lox(&newloxcred));
println!("newloxcred = {:?}", newloxcred);
// Check that we can use the credenital to read a bucket
let (id, key) = bridge_table::from_scalar(newloxcred.bucket).unwrap();
let bucket = ba.bridge_table.decrypt_bucket_id(id, &key).unwrap();
println!("bucket = {:?}", bucket);
}