The complete blockage migration protocol

crates/lox-library/src/lib.rs

@@ -536,6 +536,7 @@ pub fn pt_dbl(P: &RistrettoPoint) -> RistrettoPoint {
 /// Response.  It also adds a handle_* function to the BridgeAuth struct
 /// that consumes a Request and produces a Result<Response, ProofError>.
 pub mod proto {
+    pub mod blockage_migration;
     pub mod check_blockage;
     pub mod issue_invite;
     pub mod level_up;

crates/lox-library/src/proto/blockage_migration.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@
+/*! A module for the protocol for the user of trust level 3 or higher to
+migrate from one bucket to another because their current bucket has been
+blocked.  Their trust level will go down by 2.
+
+The user presents their current Lox credential:
+
+- id: revealed
+- bucket: blinded
+- trust_level: revealed to be 3 or higher
+- level_since: blinded
+- invites_remaining: blinded
+- blockages: blinded
+
+and a Migration credential:
+
+- id: revealed as the same as the Lox credential id above
+- from_bucket: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's the same as the
+  bucket in the Lox credential above
+- to_bucket: blinded
+
+and a new Lox credential to be issued:
+
+- id: jointly chosen by the user and BA
+- bucket: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's the same as the to_bucket
+  in the Migration credential above
+- trust_level: revealed to be 2 less than the trust_level above
+- level_since: today
+- invites_remaining: revealed to be LEVEL_INVITATIONS for the new trust
+  level [Actually, there's a bug in the zkp crate that's triggered when
+  a public value is 0 (the identity element of the Ristretto group), so
+  we treat this field as blinded, but the _server_ encrypts the value.]
+- blockages: blinded, but proved in ZK that it's one more than the
+  blockages above
+
+*/
+
+use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoBasepointTable;
+use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
+use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
+use curve25519_dalek::traits::IsIdentity;
+
+use zkp::CompactProof;
+use zkp::ProofError;
+use zkp::Transcript;
+
+use super::super::cred;
+use super::super::dup_filter::SeenType;
+use super::super::migration_table::MigrationType;
+use super::super::scalar_u32;
+use super::super::{BridgeAuth, IssuerPubKey};
+use super::super::{CMZ_A, CMZ_A_TABLE, CMZ_B, CMZ_B_TABLE};
+use super::check_blockage::MIN_TRUST_LEVEL;
+use super::level_up::LEVEL_INVITATIONS;
+
+pub struct Request {
+    // Fields for blind showing the Lox credential
+    P_lox: RistrettoPoint,
+    id: Scalar,
+    CBucket: RistrettoPoint,
+    trust_level: Scalar,
+    CSince: RistrettoPoint,
+    CInvRemain: RistrettoPoint,
+    CBlockages: RistrettoPoint,
+    CQ_lox: RistrettoPoint,
+
+    // Fields for blind showing the Migration credential
+    P_mig: RistrettoPoint,
+    CFromBucket: RistrettoPoint,
+    CToBucket: RistrettoPoint,
+    CQ_mig: RistrettoPoint,
+
+    // Fields for user blinding of the Lox credential to be issued
+    D: RistrettoPoint,
+    EncIdClient: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
+    EncBucket: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
+    EncBlockages: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
+
+    // The combined ZKP
+    piUser: CompactProof,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct State {
+    d: Scalar,
+    D: RistrettoPoint,
+    EncIdClient: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
+    EncBucket: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
+    EncBlockages: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
+    id_client: Scalar,
+    to_bucket: Scalar,
+    trust_level: Scalar,
+    blockages: Scalar,
+}
+
+pub struct Response {
+    // The new attributes; the trust_level and invites_remaining are
+    // implicit
+    level_since: Scalar,
+
+    // The fields for the new Lox credential
+    P: RistrettoPoint,
+    EncQ: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
+    EncInvRemain: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
+    id_server: Scalar,
+    TId: RistrettoPoint,
+    TBucket: RistrettoPoint,
+    TInvRemain: RistrettoPoint,
+    TBlockages: RistrettoPoint,
+
+    // The ZKP
+    piBlindIssue: CompactProof,
+}
+
+define_proof! {
+    requestproof,
+    "Blockage Migration Request",
+    (bucket, since, invremain, blockages, zbucket, zsince, zinvremain,
+     zblockages, negzQ_lox,
+     tobucket, zfrombucket, ztobucket, negzQ_mig,
+     d, eid_client, ebucket, eblockages, id_client),
+    (P_lox, CBucket, CSince, CInvRemain, CBlockages, V_lox, Xbucket,
+     Xsince, Xinvremain, Xblockages,
+     P_mig, CFromBucket, CToBucket, V_mig, Xfrombucket, Xtobucket,
+     D, EncIdClient0, EncIdClient1, EncBucket0, EncBucket1,
+     EncBlockages0, EncBlockages1_minus_B),
+    (A, B):
+    // Blind showing of the Lox credential
+    CBucket = (bucket*P_lox + zbucket*A),
+    CSince = (since*P_lox + zsince*A),
+    CInvRemain = (invremain*P_lox + zinvremain*A),
+    CBlockages = (blockages*P_lox + zblockages*A),
+    V_lox = (zbucket*Xbucket + zsince*Xsince + zinvremain*Xinvremain
+        + zblockages*Xblockages + negzQ_lox*A),
+    // Blind showing of the Migration credential; note the use of the
+    // same "bucket" secret variable
+    CFromBucket = (bucket*P_mig + zfrombucket*A),
+    CToBucket = (tobucket*P_mig + ztobucket*A),
+    V_mig = (zfrombucket*Xfrombucket + ztobucket*Xtobucket + negzQ_mig*A),
+    // User blinding of the Lox credential to be issued; note the use of
+    // the same "tobucket" secret variable
+    D = (d*B),
+    EncIdClient0 = (eid_client*B),
+    EncIdClient1 = (id_client*B + eid_client*D),
+    EncBucket0 = (ebucket*B),
+    EncBucket1 = (tobucket*B + ebucket*D),
+    EncBlockages0 = (eblockages*B),
+    EncBlockages1_minus_B = (blockages*B + eblockages*D)
+}
+
+define_proof! {
+    blindissue,
+    "Blockage Migration Blind Issuing",
+    (x0, x0tilde, xid, xbucket, xlevel, xsince, xinvremain, xblockages,
+     s, b, tid, tbucket, tinvremain, tblockages),
+    (P, EncQ0, EncQ1, X0, Xid, Xbucket, Xlevel, Xsince, Xinvremain,
+    Xblockages, Plevel, Psince, TId, TBucket, TInvRemain, TBlockages,
+     D, EncId0, EncId1, EncBucket0, EncBucket1, EncInvRemain0,
+     EncInvRemain1, EncBlockages0, EncBlockages1),
+    (A, B):
+    Xid = (xid*A),
+    Xlevel = (xlevel*A),
+    Xbucket = (xbucket*A),
+    Xsince = (xsince*A),
+    Xinvremain = (xinvremain*A),
+    Xblockages = (xblockages*A),
+    X0 = (x0*B + x0tilde*A),
+    P = (b*B),
+    TId = (b*Xid),
+    TId = (tid*A),
+    TBucket = (b*Xbucket),
+    TBucket = (tbucket*A),
+    TInvRemain = (b*Xinvremain),
+    TInvRemain = (tinvremain*A),
+    TBlockages = (b*Xblockages),
+    TBlockages = (tblockages*A),
+    EncQ0 = (s*B + tid*EncId0 + tbucket*EncBucket0
+        + tinvremain*EncInvRemain0 + tblockages*EncBlockages0),
+    EncQ1 = (s*D + tid*EncId1 + tbucket*EncBucket1
+        + tinvremain*EncInvRemain1 + tblockages*EncBlockages1
+        + x0*P + xlevel*Plevel + xsince*Psince)
+}
+
+pub fn request(
+    lox_cred: &cred::Lox,
+    migration_cred: &cred::Migration,
+    lox_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
+    migration_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
+) -> Result<(Request, State), ProofError> {
+    let A: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_A;
+    let B: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_B;
+    let Atable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_A_TABLE;
+    let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
+
+    // Ensure that the credenials can be correctly shown; that is, the
+    // ids match and the Lox credential bucket matches the Migration
+    // credential from_bucket
+    if lox_cred.id != migration_cred.lox_id || lox_cred.bucket != migration_cred.from_bucket {
+        return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
+    }
+
+    // The trust level must be at least MIN_TRUST_LEVEL
+    let level: u32 = match scalar_u32(&lox_cred.trust_level) {
+        Some(v) => v,
+        None => return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure),
+    };
+    if level < MIN_TRUST_LEVEL {
+        return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
+    }
+
+    // Blind showing the Lox credential
+
+    // Reblind P and Q
+    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
+    let t_lox = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let P_lox = t_lox * lox_cred.P;
+    let Q_lox = t_lox * lox_cred.Q;
+
+    // Form Pedersen commitments to the blinded attributes
+    let zbucket = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let zsince = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let zinvremain = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let zblockages = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let CBucket = lox_cred.bucket * P_lox + &zbucket * Atable;
+    let CSince = lox_cred.level_since * P_lox + &zsince * Atable;
+    let CInvRemain = lox_cred.invites_remaining * P_lox + &zinvremain * Atable;
+    let CBlockages = lox_cred.blockages * P_lox + &zblockages * Atable;
+
+    // Form a Pedersen commitment to the MAC Q
+    // We flip the sign of zQ from that of the Hyphae paper so that
+    // the ZKP has a "+" instead of a "-", as that's what the zkp
+    // macro supports.
+    let negzQ_lox = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let CQ_lox = Q_lox - &negzQ_lox * Atable;
+
+    // Compute the "error factor"
+    let V_lox = zbucket * lox_pub.X[2]
+        + zsince * lox_pub.X[4]
+        + zinvremain * lox_pub.X[5]
+        + zblockages * lox_pub.X[6]
+        + &negzQ_lox * Atable;
+
+    // Blind showing the Migration credential
+
+    // Reblind P and Q
+    let t_mig = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let P_mig = t_mig * migration_cred.P;
+    let Q_mig = t_mig * migration_cred.Q;
+
+    // Form Pedersen commitments to the blinded attributes
+    let zfrombucket = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let ztobucket = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let CFromBucket = migration_cred.from_bucket * P_mig + &zfrombucket * Atable;
+    let CToBucket = migration_cred.to_bucket * P_mig + &ztobucket * Atable;
+
+    // Form a Pedersen commitment to the MAC Q
+    // We flip the sign of zQ from that of the Hyphae paper so that
+    // the ZKP has a "+" instead of a "-", as that's what the zkp
+    // macro supports.
+    let negzQ_mig = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let CQ_mig = Q_mig - &negzQ_mig * Atable;
+
+    // Compute the "error factor"
+    let V_mig =
+        zfrombucket * migration_pub.X[2] + ztobucket * migration_pub.X[3] + &negzQ_mig * Atable;
+
+    // User blinding for the Lox certificate to be issued
+
+    // Pick an ElGamal keypair
+    let d = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let D = &d * Btable;
+
+    // Pick a random client component of the id
+    let id_client = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+
+    // Encrypt it (times the basepoint B) to the ElGamal public key D we
+    // just created
+    let eid_client = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let EncIdClient = (&eid_client * Btable, &id_client * Btable + eid_client * D);
+
+    // Encrypt the other blinded attributes (times B) to D as well
+    let ebucket = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let EncBucket = (
+        &ebucket * Btable,
+        &migration_cred.to_bucket * Btable + ebucket * D,
+    );
+    let eblockages = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+    let new_blockages = lox_cred.blockages + Scalar::one();
+    let EncBlockages = (
+        &eblockages * Btable,
+        &new_blockages * Btable + eblockages * D,
+    );
+
+    // Construct the proof
+    let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"blockage migration request");
+    let piUser = requestproof::prove_compact(
+        &mut transcript,
+        requestproof::ProveAssignments {
+            A: &A,
+            B: &B,
+            P_lox: &P_lox,
+            CBucket: &CBucket,
+            CSince: &CSince,
+            CInvRemain: &CInvRemain,
+            CBlockages: &CBlockages,
+            V_lox: &V_lox,
+            Xbucket: &lox_pub.X[2],
+            Xsince: &lox_pub.X[4],
+            Xinvremain: &lox_pub.X[5],
+            Xblockages: &lox_pub.X[6],
+            P_mig: &P_mig,
+            CFromBucket: &CFromBucket,
+            CToBucket: &CToBucket,
+            V_mig: &V_mig,
+            Xfrombucket: &migration_pub.X[2],
+            Xtobucket: &migration_pub.X[3],
+            D: &D,
+            EncIdClient0: &EncIdClient.0,
+            EncIdClient1: &EncIdClient.1,
+            EncBucket0: &EncBucket.0,
+            EncBucket1: &EncBucket.1,
+            EncBlockages0: &EncBlockages.0,
+            EncBlockages1_minus_B: &(EncBlockages.1 - B),
+            bucket: &lox_cred.bucket,
+            since: &lox_cred.level_since,
+            invremain: &lox_cred.invites_remaining,
+            blockages: &lox_cred.blockages,
+            zbucket: &zbucket,
+            zsince: &zsince,
+            zinvremain: &zinvremain,
+            zblockages: &zblockages,
+            negzQ_lox: &negzQ_lox,
+            tobucket: &migration_cred.to_bucket,
+            zfrombucket: &zfrombucket,
+            ztobucket: &ztobucket,
+            negzQ_mig: &negzQ_mig,
+            d: &d,
+            eid_client: &eid_client,
+            ebucket: &ebucket,
+            eblockages: &eblockages,
+            id_client: &id_client,
+        },
+    )
+    .0;
+
+    Ok((
+        Request {
+            P_lox,
+            id: lox_cred.id,
+            CBucket,
+            trust_level: lox_cred.trust_level,
+            CSince,
+            CInvRemain,
+            CBlockages,
+            CQ_lox,
+            P_mig,
+            CFromBucket,
+            CToBucket,
+            CQ_mig,
+            D,
+            EncIdClient,
+            EncBucket,
+            EncBlockages,
+            piUser,
+        },
+        State {
+            d,
+            D,
+            EncIdClient,
+            EncBucket,
+            EncBlockages,
+            id_client,
+            to_bucket: migration_cred.to_bucket,
+            trust_level: (level - 2).into(),
+            blockages: new_blockages,
+        },
+    ))
+}
+
+impl BridgeAuth {
+    /// Receive a blockage migration request
+    pub fn handle_blockage_migration(&mut self, req: Request) -> Result<Response, ProofError> {
+        let A: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_A;
+        let B: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_B;
+        let Atable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_A_TABLE;
+        let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
+
+        if req.P_lox.is_identity() || req.P_mig.is_identity() {
+            return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
+        }
+
+        // The trust level must be at least MIN_TRUST_LEVEL
+        let level: u32 = match scalar_u32(&req.trust_level) {
+            Some(v) => v,
+            None => return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure),
+        };
+        if level < MIN_TRUST_LEVEL {
+            return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
+        }
+
+        // Recompute the "error factors" using knowledge of our own
+        // (the issuer's) private key instead of knowledge of the
+        // hidden attributes
+        let Vprime_lox = (self.lox_priv.x[0]
+            + self.lox_priv.x[1] * req.id
+            + self.lox_priv.x[3] * req.trust_level)
+            * req.P_lox
+            + self.lox_priv.x[2] * req.CBucket
+            + self.lox_priv.x[4] * req.CSince
+            + self.lox_priv.x[5] * req.CInvRemain
+            + self.lox_priv.x[6] * req.CBlockages
+            - req.CQ_lox;
+
+        let migration_type: Scalar = MigrationType::Blockage.into();
+        let Vprime_mig = (self.migration_priv.x[0]
+            + self.migration_priv.x[1] * req.id
+            + self.migration_priv.x[4] * migration_type)
+            * req.P_mig
+            + self.migration_priv.x[2] * req.CFromBucket
+            + self.migration_priv.x[3] * req.CToBucket
+            - req.CQ_mig;
+
+        // Verify the ZKP
+        let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"blockage migration request");
+        requestproof::verify_compact(
+            &req.piUser,
+            &mut transcript,
+            requestproof::VerifyAssignments {
+                A: &A.compress(),
+                B: &B.compress(),
+                P_lox: &req.P_lox.compress(),
+                CBucket: &req.CBucket.compress(),
+                CSince: &req.CSince.compress(),
+                CInvRemain: &req.CInvRemain.compress(),
+                CBlockages: &req.CBlockages.compress(),
+                V_lox: &Vprime_lox.compress(),
+                Xbucket: &self.lox_pub.X[2].compress(),
+                Xsince: &self.lox_pub.X[4].compress(),
+                Xinvremain: &self.lox_pub.X[5].compress(),
+                Xblockages: &self.lox_pub.X[6].compress(),
+                P_mig: &req.P_mig.compress(),
+                CFromBucket: &req.CFromBucket.compress(),
+                CToBucket: &req.CToBucket.compress(),
+                V_mig: &Vprime_mig.compress(),
+                Xfrombucket: &self.migration_pub.X[2].compress(),
+                Xtobucket: &self.migration_pub.X[3].compress(),
+                D: &req.D.compress(),
+                EncIdClient0: &req.EncIdClient.0.compress(),
+                EncIdClient1: &req.EncIdClient.1.compress(),
+                EncBucket0: &req.EncBucket.0.compress(),
+                EncBucket1: &req.EncBucket.1.compress(),
+                EncBlockages0: &req.EncBlockages.0.compress(),
+                EncBlockages1_minus_B: &(req.EncBlockages.1 - B).compress(),
+            },
+        )?;
+
+        // Ensure the id has not been seen before, and add it to the
+        // seen list.
+        if self.id_filter.filter(&req.id) == SeenType::Seen {
+            return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
+        }
+
+        // Blind issuing of the new Lox credential
+
+        // Choose a random server id component to add to the client's
+        // (blinded) id component
+        let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
+        let id_server = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+        let EncId = (req.EncIdClient.0, req.EncIdClient.1 + &id_server * Btable);
+
+        // Create the trust_level attrubute (Scalar), which will be
+        // 2 levels down from the one in the provided credential
+        let trust_level: Scalar = (level - 2).into();
+
+        // Create the level_since attribute (Scalar), which is today's
+        // Julian date
+        let level_since: Scalar = self.today().into();
+
+        // The invites remaining is the appropriate number for the new
+        // level (note that LEVEL_INVITATIONS[i] is the number of
+        // invitations for moving from level i to level i+1)
+        let invremain: Scalar = LEVEL_INVITATIONS[(level - 3) as usize].into();
+
+        // Because of the bug in the zkp crate, encrypt the invites
+        // remaining instead of sending it in the clear
+        let sinvremain = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+        let EncInvRemain = (
+            &sinvremain * Btable,
+            &invremain * Btable + sinvremain * req.D,
+        );
+
+        // Compute the MAC on the visible attributes
+        let b = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+        let P = &b * Btable;
+        let QHc = (self.lox_priv.x[0]
+            + self.lox_priv.x[3] * trust_level
+            + self.lox_priv.x[4] * level_since)
+            * P;
+
+        // El Gamal encrypt it to the public key req.D
+        let s = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
+        let EncQHc = (&s * Btable, QHc + s * req.D);
+
+        // Homomorphically compute the part of the MAC corresponding to
+        // the blinded attributes
+        let tid = self.lox_priv.x[1] * b;
+        let TId = &tid * Atable;
+        let EncQId = (tid * EncId.0, tid * EncId.1);
+        let tbucket = self.lox_priv.x[2] * b;
+        let TBucket = &tbucket * Atable;
+        let EncQBucket = (tbucket * req.EncBucket.0, tbucket * req.EncBucket.1);
+        let tinvremain = self.lox_priv.x[5] * b;
+        let TInvRemain = &tinvremain * Atable;
+        let EncQInvRemain = (tinvremain * EncInvRemain.0, tinvremain * EncInvRemain.1);
+        let tblockages = self.lox_priv.x[6] * b;
+        let TBlockages = &tblockages * Atable;
+        let EncQBlockages = (
+            tblockages * req.EncBlockages.0,
+            tblockages * req.EncBlockages.1,
+        );
+
+        let EncQ = (
+            EncQHc.0 + EncQId.0 + EncQBucket.0 + EncQInvRemain.0 + EncQBlockages.0,
+            EncQHc.1 + EncQId.1 + EncQBucket.1 + EncQInvRemain.1 + EncQBlockages.1,
+        );
+
+        let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"blockage migration issuing");
+        let piBlindIssue = blindissue::prove_compact(
+            &mut transcript,
+            blindissue::ProveAssignments {
+                A: &A,
+                B: &B,
+                P: &P,
+                EncQ0: &EncQ.0,
+                EncQ1: &EncQ.1,
+                X0: &self.lox_pub.X[0],
+                Xid: &self.lox_pub.X[1],
+                Xbucket: &self.lox_pub.X[2],
+                Xlevel: &self.lox_pub.X[3],
+                Xsince: &self.lox_pub.X[4],
+                Xinvremain: &self.lox_pub.X[5],
+                Xblockages: &self.lox_pub.X[6],
+                Plevel: &(trust_level * P),
+                Psince: &(level_since * P),
+                TId: &TId,
+                TBucket: &TBucket,
+                TInvRemain: &TInvRemain,
+                TBlockages: &TBlockages,
+                D: &req.D,
+                EncId0: &EncId.0,
+                EncId1: &EncId.1,
+                EncBucket0: &req.EncBucket.0,
+                EncBucket1: &req.EncBucket.1,
+                EncInvRemain0: &EncInvRemain.0,
+                EncInvRemain1: &EncInvRemain.1,
+                EncBlockages0: &req.EncBlockages.0,
+                EncBlockages1: &req.EncBlockages.1,
+                x0: &self.lox_priv.x[0],
+                x0tilde: &self.lox_priv.x0tilde,
+                xid: &self.lox_priv.x[1],
+                xbucket: &self.lox_priv.x[2],
+                xlevel: &self.lox_priv.x[3],
+                xsince: &self.lox_priv.x[4],
+                xinvremain: &self.lox_priv.x[5],
+                xblockages: &self.lox_priv.x[6],
+                s: &s,
+                b: &b,
+                tid: &tid,
+                tbucket: &tbucket,
+                tinvremain: &tinvremain,
+                tblockages: &tblockages,
+            },
+        )
+        .0;
+
+        Ok(Response {
+            level_since,
+            P,
+            EncQ,
+            EncInvRemain,
+            id_server,
+            TId,
+            TBucket,
+            TInvRemain,
+            TBlockages,
+            piBlindIssue,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+/// Handle the response to the request, producing the new Lox credential
+/// if successful.
+pub fn handle_response(
+    state: State,
+    resp: Response,
+    lox_pub: &IssuerPubKey,
+) -> Result<cred::Lox, ProofError> {
+    let A: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_A;
+    let B: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_B;
+    let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
+
+    if resp.P.is_identity() {
+        return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
+    }
+
+    // Add the server's contribution to the id to our own, both in plain
+    // and encrypted form
+    let id = state.id_client + resp.id_server;
+    let EncId = (
+        state.EncIdClient.0,
+        state.EncIdClient.1 + &resp.id_server * Btable,
+    );
+
+    let new_level: u32 = match scalar_u32(&state.trust_level) {
+        Some(v) => v,
+        None => return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure),
+    };
+    if new_level < 1 {
+        return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
+    }
+
+    // The invites remaining is the appropriate number for the new level
+    // (note that LEVEL_INVITATIONS[i] is the number of invitations for
+    // moving from level i to level i+1)
+    let invremain: Scalar = LEVEL_INVITATIONS[(new_level - 1) as usize].into();
+
+    // Decrypt EncInvRemain
+    let recv_invremain = resp.EncInvRemain.1 - (state.d * resp.EncInvRemain.0);
+
+    if recv_invremain != &invremain * Btable {
+        return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
+    }
+
+    // Verify the proof
+    let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"blockage migration issuing");
+    blindissue::verify_compact(
+        &resp.piBlindIssue,
+        &mut transcript,
+        blindissue::VerifyAssignments {
+            A: &A.compress(),
+            B: &B.compress(),
+            P: &resp.P.compress(),
+            EncQ0: &resp.EncQ.0.compress(),
+            EncQ1: &resp.EncQ.1.compress(),
+            X0: &lox_pub.X[0].compress(),
+            Xid: &lox_pub.X[1].compress(),
+            Xbucket: &lox_pub.X[2].compress(),
+            Xlevel: &lox_pub.X[3].compress(),
+            Xsince: &lox_pub.X[4].compress(),
+            Xinvremain: &lox_pub.X[5].compress(),
+            Xblockages: &lox_pub.X[6].compress(),
+            Plevel: &(state.trust_level * resp.P).compress(),
+            Psince: &(resp.level_since * resp.P).compress(),
+            TId: &resp.TId.compress(),
+            TBucket: &resp.TBucket.compress(),
+            TInvRemain: &resp.TInvRemain.compress(),
+            TBlockages: &resp.TBlockages.compress(),
+            D: &state.D.compress(),
+            EncId0: &EncId.0.compress(),
+            EncId1: &EncId.1.compress(),
+            EncBucket0: &state.EncBucket.0.compress(),
+            EncBucket1: &state.EncBucket.1.compress(),
+            EncInvRemain0: &resp.EncInvRemain.0.compress(),
+            EncInvRemain1: &resp.EncInvRemain.1.compress(),
+            EncBlockages0: &state.EncBlockages.0.compress(),
+            EncBlockages1: &state.EncBlockages.1.compress(),
+        },
+    )?;
+
+    // Decrypt EncQ
+    let Q = resp.EncQ.1 - (state.d * resp.EncQ.0);
+
+    Ok(cred::Lox {
+        P: resp.P,
+        Q,
+        id,
+        bucket: state.to_bucket,
+        trust_level: new_level.into(),
+        level_since: resp.level_since,
+        invites_remaining: invremain,
+        blockages: state.blockages,
+    })
+}

crates/lox-library/src/proto/migration.rs

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 /*! A module for the protocol for the user to migrate from one bucket to
-another (and possibly also change trust level).
+another and change trust level from untrusted (trust level 0) to trusted
+(trust level 1).
 
-For the case of migrating from trust level 0 (a one-bridge bucket) to
+The user presents their current Lox credential:
-trust level 1 (a three-bridge bucket), the user presents their current
-Lox credential:
 
 - id: revealed
 - bucket: blinded
@@ -163,8 +162,8 @@ pub fn request(
         return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
     }
 
-    // We only support migrating from trust level 0 to trust level 1
+    // This protocol only allows migrating from trust level 0 to trust
-    // right now
+    // level 1
     if lox_cred.trust_level != Scalar::zero() {
         return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
     }

crates/lox-library/src/tests.rs

@@ -126,6 +126,14 @@ impl TestHarness {
         let resp = self.ba.handle_check_blockage(req).unwrap();
         check_blockage::handle_response(state, resp).unwrap()
     }
+
+    fn blockage_migration(&mut self, cred: &cred::Lox, mig: &cred::Migration) -> cred::Lox {
+        let (req, state) =
+            blockage_migration::request(&cred, &mig, &self.ba.lox_pub, &self.ba.migration_pub)
+                .unwrap();
+        let resp = self.ba.handle_blockage_migration(req).unwrap();
+        blockage_migration::handle_response(state, resp, &self.ba.lox_pub).unwrap()
+    }
 }
 
 #[test]
@@ -358,7 +366,7 @@ fn test_mark_unreachable() {
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn test_check_blockage() {
+fn test_blockage_migration() {
     let mut th = TestHarness::new();
 
     // Join an untrusted user
@@ -420,4 +428,10 @@ fn test_check_blockage() {
     let migration = th.check_blockage(&cred3);
 
     println!("migration = {:?}", migration);
+
+    // Migrate
+    let cred4 = th.blockage_migration(&cred3, &migration);
+
+    println!("cred4 = {:?}", cred4);
+    assert!(th.ba.verify_lox(&cred4));
 }