The response message of the trust promotion protocol

This commit is contained in:
Ian Goldberg 2021-04-30 11:58:31 -04:00
parent 2ffa2c6ab0
commit 03de724a8c
7 changed files with 224 additions and 11 deletions

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@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ edition = "2018"
[dependencies]
curve25519-dalek = { package = "curve25519-dalek-ng", version = "3", default-features = false, features = ["serde", "std"] }
ed25519-dalek = "1"
zkp = { version = "0.8", features = ["debug-transcript"] }
# zkp = { version = "0.8", features = ["debug-transcript"] }
zkp = "0.8"
bincode = "1"
rand = "0.7"
serde = "1"

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@ -252,11 +252,11 @@ mod tests {
}
/// Convert an id and key to a Scalar attribute
pub fn to_scalar(id: u32, key: [u8; 16]) -> Scalar {
pub fn to_scalar(id: u32, key: &[u8; 16]) -> Scalar {
let mut b: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
// b is a little-endian representation of the Scalar; put the key in
// the low 16 bytes, and the id in the next 4 bytes.
b[0..16].copy_from_slice(&key);
b[0..16].copy_from_slice(key);
b[16..20].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
// This cannot fail, since we're only using the low 20 bytes of b
Scalar::from_canonical_bytes(b).unwrap()

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@ -8,8 +8,163 @@ that the credentials contain the bucket attributes, which include both
the id and the bucket decrytpion key, but the table just contains the
bucket ids.) */
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoBasepointTable;
use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
use sha2::Digest;
use sha2::Sha256;
use aes_gcm::aead::{generic_array::GenericArray, Aead, NewAead};
use aes_gcm::Aes128Gcm;
use rand::RngCore;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use super::bridge_table;
use super::IssuerPrivKey;
use super::CMZ_B_TABLE;
/// Each (plaintext) entry in the returned migration table is serialized
/// into this many bytes
pub const MIGRATION_BYTES: usize = 96;
/// The size of an encrypted entry in the returned migration table
pub const ENC_MIGRATION_BYTES: usize = MIGRATION_BYTES + 12 + 16;
/// The migration table
#[derive(Default, Debug)]
pub struct MigrationTable {
pub table: Vec<(u32, u32)>,
pub table: HashMap<u32, u32>,
}
/// Create an encrypted Migration credential for returning to the user
/// in the trust promotion protocol.
///
/// Given the attributes of a Migration credential, produce a serialized
/// version (containing only the to_bucket and the MAC, since the
/// receiver will already know the id and from_bucket), encrypted with
/// H2(id, from_bucket, Qk), for the Qk portion of the MAC on the
/// corresponding Migration Key credential (with fixed Pk, given as a
/// precomputed multiplication table). Return the label H1(id,
/// from_attr_i, Qk_i) and the encrypted Migration credential. H1 and
/// H2 are the first 16 bytes and the second 16 bytes respectively of
/// the SHA256 hash of the input.
pub fn encrypt_cred(
id: &Scalar,
from_bucket: &Scalar,
to_bucket: &Scalar,
Pktable: &RistrettoBasepointTable,
migration_priv: &IssuerPrivKey,
migrationkey_priv: &IssuerPrivKey,
) -> ([u8; 16], [u8; ENC_MIGRATION_BYTES]) {
let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
// Compute the Migration Key credential MAC Qk
let Qk = &(migrationkey_priv.x[0]
+ migrationkey_priv.x[1] * id
+ migrationkey_priv.x[2] * from_bucket)
* Pktable;
// Compute a MAC (P, Q) on the Migration credential
let b = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let P = &b * Btable;
let Q = &(b
* (migration_priv.x[0]
+ migration_priv.x[1] * id
+ migration_priv.x[2] * from_bucket
+ migration_priv.x[3] * to_bucket))
* Btable;
// Serialize (to_bucket, P, Q)
let mut credbytes: [u8; MIGRATION_BYTES] = [0; MIGRATION_BYTES];
credbytes[0..32].copy_from_slice(&to_bucket.as_bytes()[..]);
credbytes[32..64].copy_from_slice(&P.compress().as_bytes()[..]);
credbytes[64..].copy_from_slice(&Q.compress().as_bytes()[..]);
// Pick a random nonce
let mut noncebytes: [u8; 12] = [0; 12];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut noncebytes);
let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(&noncebytes);
// Compute the hash of (id, from_bucket, Qk)
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(&id.as_bytes()[..]);
hasher.update(&from_bucket.as_bytes()[..]);
hasher.update(&Qk.compress().as_bytes()[..]);
let fullhash = hasher.finalize();
// Create the encryption key from the 2nd half of the hash
let aeskey = GenericArray::from_slice(&fullhash[16..]);
// Encrypt
let cipher = Aes128Gcm::new(aeskey);
let ciphertext: Vec<u8> = cipher.encrypt(&nonce, credbytes.as_ref()).unwrap();
let mut enccredbytes: [u8; ENC_MIGRATION_BYTES] = [0; ENC_MIGRATION_BYTES];
enccredbytes[..12].copy_from_slice(&noncebytes);
enccredbytes[12..].copy_from_slice(ciphertext.as_slice());
// Use the first half of the above hash as the label
let mut label: [u8; 16] = [0; 16];
label[..].copy_from_slice(&fullhash[..16]);
(label, enccredbytes)
}
/// Create an encrypted Migration credential for returning to the user
/// in the trust promotion protocol, given the ids of the from and to
/// buckets, and using a BridgeTable to get the bucket keys.
///
/// Otherwise the same as encrypt_cred, above, except it returns an
/// Option in case the passed ids were invalid.
pub fn encrypt_cred_ids(
id: &Scalar,
from_id: u32,
to_id: u32,
bridgetable: &bridge_table::BridgeTable,
Pktable: &RistrettoBasepointTable,
migration_priv: &IssuerPrivKey,
migrationkey_priv: &IssuerPrivKey,
) -> Option<([u8; 16], [u8; ENC_MIGRATION_BYTES])> {
// Look up the bucket keys and form the attributes (Scalars)
let fromkey = bridgetable.keys.get(from_id as usize)?;
let tokey = bridgetable.keys.get(to_id as usize)?;
Some(encrypt_cred(
id,
&bridge_table::to_scalar(from_id, fromkey),
&bridge_table::to_scalar(to_id, tokey),
Pktable,
migration_priv,
migrationkey_priv,
))
}
impl MigrationTable {
/// For each entry in the MigrationTable, use encrypt_cred_ids to
/// produce an entry in an output HashMap (from labels to encrypted
/// Migration credentials).
pub fn encrypt_table(
&self,
id: &Scalar,
bridgetable: &bridge_table::BridgeTable,
Pktable: &RistrettoBasepointTable,
migration_priv: &IssuerPrivKey,
migrationkey_priv: &IssuerPrivKey,
) -> HashMap<[u8; 16], [u8; ENC_MIGRATION_BYTES]> {
self.table
.iter()
.map(|(from_id, to_id)| {
encrypt_cred_ids(
id,
*from_id,
*to_id,
bridgetable,
Pktable,
migration_priv,
migrationkey_priv,
)
.unwrap()
})
.collect()
}
}

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@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ impl BridgeAuth {
// Create the bucket attribute (Scalar), which is a combination
// of the bucket id (u32) and the bucket's decryption key ([u8; 16])
let bucket_key = self.bridge_table.keys[bucket_id];
let bucket: Scalar = bridge_table::to_scalar(bucket_id_u32, bucket_key);
let bucket: Scalar = bridge_table::to_scalar(bucket_id_u32, &bucket_key);
// Create the level_since attribute (Scalar), which is today's
// Julian date

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@ -69,9 +69,9 @@ fn test_trust_promotion() {
];
ba.bridge_table.new_bucket(bucket);
// Add the allowed migrations to the migration table
ba.migration_table.table.push((3 * i, 15 + i));
ba.migration_table.table.push((3 * i + 1, 15 + i));
ba.migration_table.table.push((3 * i + 2, 15 + i));
ba.migration_table.table.insert(3 * i, 15 + i);
ba.migration_table.table.insert(3 * i + 1, 15 + i);
ba.migration_table.table.insert(3 * i + 2, 15 + i);
}
// Create the encrypted bridge table
ba.bridge_table.encrypt_table();
@ -90,4 +90,5 @@ fn test_trust_promotion() {
let (promreq, promstate) = trust_promotion::request(&cred, &ba.lox_pub, ba.today()).unwrap();
let resp = ba.handle_trust_promotion(promreq).unwrap();
println!("resp = {:?}", resp);
}

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@ -36,7 +36,11 @@ use zkp::CompactProof;
use zkp::ProofError;
use zkp::Transcript;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use super::cred;
use super::dup_filter::SeenType;
use super::migration_table;
use super::{pt_dbl, scalar_dbl, scalar_u64};
use super::{BridgeAuth, IssuerPubKey};
use super::{CMZ_A, CMZ_A_TABLE, CMZ_B, CMZ_B_TABLE};
@ -97,6 +101,18 @@ pub struct State {
bucket: Scalar,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Response {
// The encrypted MAC for the Migration Key credential
Pk: RistrettoPoint,
EncQk: (RistrettoPoint, RistrettoPoint),
// A table of encrypted Migration credentials; the encryption keys
// are formed from the possible values of Qk (the decrypted form of
// EncQk)
enc_migration_table: HashMap<[u8; 16], [u8; migration_table::ENC_MIGRATION_BYTES]>,
}
define_proof! {
requestproof,
"Trust Promotion Request",
@ -395,9 +411,10 @@ pub fn request(
impl BridgeAuth {
/// Receive a trust promotion request
pub fn handle_trust_promotion(&mut self, req: Request) -> Result<(), ProofError> {
pub fn handle_trust_promotion(&mut self, req: Request) -> Result<Response, ProofError> {
let A: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_A;
let B: &RistrettoPoint = &CMZ_B;
let Btable: &RistrettoBasepointTable = &CMZ_B_TABLE;
if req.P.is_identity() {
return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
@ -467,6 +484,46 @@ impl BridgeAuth {
},
)?;
Ok(())
// Ensure the id has not been seen before, either in the general
// if filter, or the filter specifically for trust promotion.
// Add the id to the latter, but not the former.
if self.id_filter.check(&req.id) == SeenType::Seen
|| self.trust_promotion_filter.filter(&req.id) == SeenType::Seen
{
return Err(ProofError::VerificationFailure);
}
// Compute the encrypted MAC (Pk, EncQk) for the Migration Key
// credential.
// Compute the MAC on the visible attributes
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let b = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let Pk = &b * Btable;
let Pktable = RistrettoBasepointTable::create(&Pk);
let Qid = &(self.migrationkey_priv.x[0] + self.migrationkey_priv.x[1] * req.id) * &Pktable;
// El Gamal encrypt it to the public key req.D
let s = Scalar::random(&mut rng);
let EncQkid = (&s * Btable, Qid + s * req.D);
// Homomorphically compute the part of the MAC corresponding to
// the blinded attributes
let tbucket = self.migrationkey_priv.x[2] * b;
let EncQkBucket = (tbucket * req.EncBucket.0, tbucket * req.EncBucket.1);
let EncQk = (EncQkid.0 + EncQkBucket.0, EncQkid.1 + EncQkBucket.1);
Ok(Response {
Pk,
EncQk,
enc_migration_table: self.migration_table.encrypt_table(
&req.id,
&self.bridge_table,
&Pktable,
&self.migration_priv,
&self.migrationkey_priv,
),
})
}
}

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@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
use lox::dup_filter;
use lox::dup_filter::SeenType::{Fresh, Seen};
use lox::BridgeAuth;
use lox::BridgeDb;
use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;